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The Supreme Court's 1949 decision in National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.' poses an enduring puzzle for students of
the law of federal jurisdiction. The case began when the National Mu-
tual Insurance Company-a District of Columbia corporation-
brought suit in federal district court in Maryland. The plaintiff corpo-
ration invoked the federal court's diversity jurisdiction, relying upon a
then recently enacted statute that defined citizens of the District (and
other territories) as citizens of a State for diversity purposes. 2 This
definition ran headlong into the restrictive terms of Article III itself,
which provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over disputes between
"citizens of different States." 3 It also bumped into an early Marshall
* Prentice H. Marshall Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
My thanks to Thomas Lee, Ron Rotunda, and Jay Tidmarsh for helpful comments,
and to the editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for the invitation to participate in the
Federal Courts, Practice and Procedure Issue. Special thanks to David Shapiro, for his
many contributions to the field, for his comments on this Article, and for his kind
words along the way.
1 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
2 As amended, the 1940 diversity statute extended the jurisdiction of the district
courts to civil actions between citizens of different states "or citizens of the District of
Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any State or Territory." See Act of
Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)).
For the legislative history of the statute, see infra notes 178-82 and accompanying
text.
3 The diversity grant of jurisdiction, as it has come to be known, extends the
judicial power of the United States to controversies "between Citizens of different
States." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. Of an immense literature, see, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92
HARv. L. REv. 963 (1979); and David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey
and a Proposal, 91 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1977). Corporations have been deemed citizens
of their state of incorporation, and more recently of the state in which they have their
principal place of business. For more on corporate citizenship, see infra Part IV.
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Court opinion, Hepburn v. Ellzey, 4 in which the Chief Justice held that
citizens of the District of Columbia were not citizens of any state
within the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1789 for purposes of invok-
ing diversity jurisdiction. 5 Marshall's opinion, and subsequent devel-
opments, permitted specialized federal tribunals in the District of
Columbia and territories to hear disputes involving territorial citizens,
but consistently rejected the attempts of territorial citizens to bring
diversity suits in federal courts located within the States themselves. 6
Nearly 150 years later, after having reaffirmed Hepburn through
the years, 7 the Court faced the question again in Tidewater. Although
nothing in Article III had changed to support the new legislation, and
although it refused to overrule Hepburn, the Tidewater Court nonethe-
less upheld the statute.8 In permitting federal courts to exercise juris-
diction that most Justices appear to have regarded as exceeding the
scope of the Article III grant, the Court created the Tidewater
problem.
Two principal explanations have emerged in the literature for the
decision to uphold Congress's power to expand federal jurisdiction
beyond the boundaries of Article III, and both bristle with problems.
The first, offered in the Tidewater plurality opinion of Justice Jackson,
comes close to outright jurisdictional apostasy. Speaking for himself
and two others, Justice Jackson argued that Article III does not specify
an absolute ceiling on the scope of the judicial power of the federal
courts.9 Instead, Justice Jackson suggested, Congress may exercise its
powers under Article I of the Constitution to give the federal courts
jurisdiction over matters that do not come within the scope of Article
111.10 Although the remaining six Justices were quick to disavow Jus-
4 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
5 Id. at 452-53.
6 See id. at 452 (refusing to permit District citizen to bring diversity action in
federal trial court in Virginia); see also New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 91,
94-95 (1816) (holding that federal district court for the State of Louisiana may not
exercise diversity jurisdiction over dispute between citizen of Kentucky and citizen of
Mississippi territory). But cf Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 338 (1805) (hold-
ing that district court for the territory of Orleans may entertain diversity dispute be-
tween an alien and a citizen of the Orleans territory). On the history of Article I
tribunals in the territories, see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts,
and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
7 See, e.g., Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 287 (1867).
8 Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604 (1949) (plural-
ity opinion).
9 See id. at 590-91 (plurality opinion).
10 See id. at 590-600 (plurality opinion). For an overview of the opinions, see
infra Part I.
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tice Jackson's view, it nonetheless represents a challenge to the ac-
cepted portrait of federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction.
The leading alternative to Justice Jackson's account first appeared
in The Federal Courts and the Federal System, the casebook of Professors
Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler.II Building on a theory de-
veloped to defend a jurisdictional provision of the Taft-Hartley Act,
Hart and Wechsler suggested that the federal courts might exercise a
form of protective jurisdiction over claims involving District citizens.' 
2
Although it defies simple restatement, the theory of protective juris-
diction begins by identifying a field of regulatory interest over which
Congress may exercise broad legislative power. The theory suggests
that Congress may have authority to protect an area of federal interest
from potentially hostile state court adjudication by shifting the litiga-
tion into the presumptively more friendly confines of a federal court,
perhaps even where it fails to regulate the field through the passage of
rules of federal substantive law to govern the disputes. 13 Though
largely based upon state law, the resulting claims are said to arise
under federal law for protective jurisdictional purposes.
Both explanations of the Tidewater Court's apparent willingness
to press the outer limits of Article III have attracted their share of
critical notices. One leading critic, Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissented
in Tidewater itself and argued for the classic view that Congress may
not extend diversity jurisdiction to any litigants who fail to meet the
state-citizen test of Article 111.14 In a separate decision in Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills,'5 Justice Frankfurter spelled out his opposi-
tion to the theory of protective jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter
suggested that the party-based jurisdictional grants in Article III oper-
ate in effect as sources of protective jurisdiction themselves and thus
exhaust the category.1 6 Partly as a result of Justice Frankfurter's cri-
tique, protective jurisdiction remains under something of a cloud and
11 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER I]. When Hart & Wechsler
wrote, the Tidewater problem was fresh, and the issue of protective jurisdiction that it
raised bore closely on the constitutionality of the recently enacted labor contract pro-
visions of the Taft-Hartley Act. See infra note 69. With the passage of time, and the
acceptance of its result, if not its reasoning, the Tidewater problem has slipped into
relative obscurity. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 416-18 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER V] (discussing the problem briefly).
12 See infta Part II.
13 See HART & WECHSLER V, supra note 11, at 840-55.
14 Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
16 See id. at 473-77 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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has attracted little support on the Court. The Tidewater problem thus
remains to some extent unresolved.
Perhaps no solution will be forthcoming; the acceptance of mini-
mal diversity as a tool of jurisdictional expansion may contribute to
Tidewater's growing irrelevance. First formally approved in the con-
text of interpleader actions,17 minimal diversity holds that Congress
may provide for federal jurisdiction over any dispute that involves at
least two opposing parties from different states. In a world of modern,
complex, multi-party disputes, minimal diversity provides a tool of fed-
eral jurisdictional expansion that seems to pose few constitutional
problems, and nonetheless permits Congress wide discretion to shift
state law claims into federal court. Recent evidence, moreover, sug-
gests that Congress has come increasingly to rely upon minimal diver-
sity for problems that it might have once addressed through some
form of protective jurisdiction. 18 Pressed to its logical conclusion,
minimal diversity could have solved both the Tidewater and Lincoln
Mills problems; diversity of citizenship between union members and
stockholders of the business corporation would supportjurisdiction in
virtually any conceivable case.19
This Article explores an alternative solution to the problem.
Building upon a theory that Alexander Hamilton first sketched in the
Federalist Papers, this Article examines a link between diversity jurisdic-
tion and the enforcement of the "privileges and immunities" of state
citizens as guaranteed in Article IV of the Constitution.20 Hamilton's
theory portrays the diversity jurisdiction as protecting out-of-state citi-
17 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531-33 (1967).
18 In two recent instances, Congress has relied upon minimal diversity as the vehi-
cle for shifting state law claims into federal courts. In the Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Congress provided federal courts with minimal diversity
jurisdiction over civil actions that arise from a single accident involving the death of at
least seventy-five people. See Act of Nov. 2, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11,020, 116
Stat. 1758, 1826 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1369). In the Y2K Act, Congress gave
the federal courts jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity over class action dis-
putes growing out of anyY2K failure. SeeAct ofJuly 20, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113
Stat. 185 (codified at 15 U.S.C §§ 6601-6617 (2000)).
19 Jurisdictional rules today define the citizenship of a business corporation by
reference to its state of incorporation and principal place of business, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) (1) (2000), but define the citizenship of a union (and other unincorporated
associations) to be that of the citizenship of each of its members. See United Steel-
workers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 145 (1965). Although the standard grant
of diversity jurisdiction continues to require complete diversity, Congress retains
power to substitute regimes of minimal diversity. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY
KAY KANE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 159-60 (6th ed. 2002) (citing the example of
interpleader jurisdiction).
20 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
1928 [VOL. 79:5
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zens from subtle forms of state court discrimination by providing
them with an alternative federal forum in which to litigate claims
based upon what we would now characterize as state law.2 1 Although
it has drawn sharp attacks from such eminent observers as Henry
Friendly, 22 Hamilton's account broadens our understanding of diver-
sity jurisdiction and holds up rather well, even today. Over two hun-
dred years have passed and the federal system has yet to find an
effective appellate remedy for cases in which the parties suffer subtle
forms of discrimination at the hands of state court judges or juries.
Hamilton recognized that the diversity grant of Article III meant to
address the problem by empowering Congress to provide litigants
with an alternative original federal docket.
After developing the Hamiltonian link between diversity and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, this Article considers
the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it accom-
plishes a good deal more, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
the states may not make or enforce laws that abridge the "privileges or
immunities" of the citizens of the United States.23 By picking up many
of the same state law rights that lay at the heart of the original Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment seeks to ensure that all citizens of the United States, including
its newest citizens, would enjoy the same rights to own property and
make or enforce contracts that others had long enjoyed. The Recon-
struction debates reveal some reluctance to guarantee all of the politi-
cal rights of state citizenship, and thus create some uncertainty about
the precise nature of protected privileges or immunities. 24 But its
framers repeatedly drew connections between the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the enforcement of civil rights, including those that most
citizens would enforce through suits at law and equity in the state
courts.
2 5
Although the Slaughter-House Cases26 drained off much of the gen-
erative force of the clause and its partial restoration in Saenz v. Roe
remains a work in progress, 27 the Privileges or Immunities Clause may
offer a legitimate basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction in cases
21 See infra Part III.A.
22 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
23 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
24 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
26 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
27 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503-04, 510-11 (1999) (relying on the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate state laws that dis-
criminated against the right of citizens to travel freely).
20041 1929
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
such as Tidewater. The statute at issue in Tidewater provides District
citizens with an opportunity to litigate claims based upon state law in
federal court 28 but only in circumstances where the citizenship of the
opposing party gives rise to a threat of state court bias similar to that
which has long grounded diversity jurisdiction. Such state court bias
also represents a potential violation of privileges and immunities, as
Hamilton's account of the jurisdiction makes clear. One can thus
reconceptualize the Tidewater statute less as a grant of diversity juris-
diction than as permissible legislation, adopted pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause. On such an account, District citizens (as citizens of the
United States) enjoy the same right to protection against biased state
decisionmaking as all other citizens of the United States. Claims like
those in Tidewater would depend on state law, but the suits themselves
(like suits brought under a protective jurisdiction theory) would arise
under federal law for jurisdictional purposes under Article III.
On this account, the Tidewater statute would be seen as operating
as something akin to protective jurisdiction. Instead of the legislative
power of Congress over citizens of the District of Columbia, as in Hart
and Wechsler's account, the Fourteenth Amendment account por-
trays the statute as protecting the privileges or immunities of national
citizens from biased state court law enforcement. Such an account
has the advantage of linking the scope of jurisdiction rather closely to
the traditional confines of diversity jurisdiction, and thus establishes
limits on the potential scope of the doctrine. Such an account also
has the virtue of linking the new interpretation in Tidewater to a
change in the text of the Constitution. Although the Fourteenth
Amendment did not amend the diversity grant in Article III of the
Constitution, it did make a fundamental change in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, shifting from an emphasis on state citizenship as
the trigger of protection under Article IV to an emphasis on citizen-
ship in the United States. Thus, the fact that citizens of the District
enjoy all of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, in-
cluding a right to freedom from state court bias in litigation with the
citizens of an interested state, can operate to provide a constitutional
predicate for the federal statute that the Tidewater Court upheld.
28 To be sure, claims based upon the law of the District of Columbia-which a
Maryland federal district court might apply under the rule of Klaxon v. Stentor, 313
U.S. 487 (1941)-are not, strictly speaking, state law claims. But though it emanates
from an Act of Congress, the law of the District of Columbia does not operate like
much federal law. It will not support the federal question jurisdiction of the federal
courts, either originally or on appeal to the Supreme Court. For an account, see
Pfander, supra note 6. For present purposes, then, it can be analogized to state law.
[VOL. 79:51930
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While Congress thus has power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to enact legislation offering District citizens protection against
biased state court adjudication with citizens of other states, it need not
exercise that power under Section 5. Nor should the Court itself feel
obligated by the recognition of legislative power to insist as a matter of
constitutional law that Congress must supply District citizens with a
diversity docket. The Fourteenth Amendment, in general, does not
bind Congress. Butjust as the diversity jurisdiction arose initially as a
solution to subtle forms of bias, rather than the overt instances of
State discrimination that would themselves support federal question
jurisdiction, so too can subtle bias be seen as bringing congressional
enforcement powers into play to remedy expected or feared violations
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the remedial powers of Congress have been downsized in
recent years, 29 the Court has continued to recognize their existence in
circumstances where Congress might reasonably conclude that state
actions threaten federal rights.30 Here, the traditional view that po-
tential bias justifies diversity jurisdiction as a preventative measure
could help support the exercise of remedial power.
This Article develops its Fourteenth Amendment account of pro-
tective jurisdiction in five parts. Part I of the Article takes a closer look
at the opinions in the Tidewater case, examining with some care both
Justice Jackson's plurality opinion and Justice Frankfurter's dissent.
Part II shifts to consider the leading alternative account, the Hart and
Wechsler theory of protective jurisdiction. Part III explores Hamil-
ton's account of diversity jurisdiction and its link to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. Part IV examines the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, demonstrating a surprisingly strong histori-
cal case for the connection between the enforcement of rights at com-
mon law and the protection of privileges and immunities. Part V
answers predictable objections, and considers other applications to
the law of federal jurisdiction. In the end, the Article concludes that
the Fourteenth Amendment account offers an explanation of the re-
sult in Tidewater that fits better with jurisdictional law and practice
than its two principal competitors.
I. THE TIDEWATER DECISION
Part of the puzzle of Tidewater lies in understanding what all the
fuss was about. The nine Justices divided sharply, writing four sepa-
rate opinions that ran over sixty pages in the U.S. Reports, presenting
29 See infra Part IV.
30 See infra Part IV.
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interpretive issues that have kept scholars busy for several years. Jus-
tice Jackson tried to downplay the opinion's importance; it was after
all not a case about "[fundamental] rights and freedoms" but dealt
only with the power of Congress to adapt the machinery of govern-
ment to the needs of changing times.3 ' Writing in 1949, Justice Jack-
son had participated in many such adaptations, joining with others to
permit Congress to exercise a broader range of legislative powers . 2
But Justice Jackson's disclaimer did not impress his brethren. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent argued that the provisions relating to the judicial
power in Article III were among the least subject to adaptation to ac-
count for changing times.3 3 They were instead technical matters, ex-
pressed with a definiteness and precision of phrasing, that defied
expansive interpretation on the basis of new experience.3 4 Even Chief
Justice Vinson, who had little perhaps to add to the debate, felt con-
strained to write separately because of "the importance of these ques-
tions to the administration of the federal court system."35
Tidewater thus presents the questions of constitutional change
and original meaning as they relate to the judicial power of the
United States. The continuing relevance of the original meaning
stems in part from Article III's capacity to accommodate changes in
federal legislative power. Article III confers judicial authority over
cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States 36-terms deliberately framed to encompass litigation over any
question of federal constitutional or statutory law, whenever adopted.
But the principle of coextensivity that underlies this flexible grant of
judicial power does little to expand the federal judiciary's authority
over matters that fail to present a federal question. As a consequence,
the Justices in Tidewater faced the question of constitutional change in
perhaps its least appealing guise: a statute that purported to expand
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the scope set
forth in Article III.
31 Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 585-86 (1949)
(plurality opinion).
32 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (upholding power of
Congress, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate wheat a farmer grew and withheld
from the market; adopting the theory that wheat withheld from the market might, if
aggregated over many similar transactions nationwide, produce a "substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce"). On the significance of Wickards aggregation
approach to the modern expansion of the Commerce power, see ERWAIN CHEMERINSKV,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 254-55 (2d ed. 2002).
33 See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34 See id. at 654 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 627 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
36 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
1932 [VOL- 79:5
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Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Tidewater gave voice to this con-
cern with the expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction. To be sure,
Justice Frankfurter expressed the classic position that, under princi-
ples of respect for the reserved powers of the states, Congress lacks
power to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond the limits of
Article III.3 7 But Justice Frankfurter also drew upon the progressive
critique of diversity jurisdiction as federal judicial interference in the
rightful lawmaking power of the state courts. 38 Justice Frankfurter
shared the view of his student and protege, Henry Friendly, that diver-
sity jurisdiction had no obvious role to play in a federal system in
which state courts provided an acceptable forum for the enforcement
of state law and out-of-state citizens no longer faced the same threat of
biased decisionmaking that had grounded the jurisdiction as an origi-
nal matter.3
9
Progressives like Justice Frankfurter also worried that corporate
access to diversity dockets enabled the modern business enterprise to
escape state court regulation.40 Justice Brandeis's opinion in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins"1 had reduced the threat of federal judicial inter-
vention into the realm of state common law. But the rise of the
business corporation, and its recognition as a citizen of its state of
incorporation for purposes of diversity, had facilitated a great expan-
sion of federal diversity dockets that in some ways anticipated and fu-
eled the Lochner era.42  Tidewater involved a dispute between two
corporations, one a citizen of Virginia and one of the District.43 While
a contest over state contract law between corporate parties may have
had little significance for individual rights and freedoms, it implicated
the progressive worry about the changing function of federal diversity
courts from an alternative forum to address bias against those living
outside a particular state to a forum for corporate litigants.
Out of this stew of jurisdictional issues emerged an original and
deeply conflicted set of opinions.44 Speaking for two others, Justice
37 Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
38 See id. at 650-52 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39 See id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 143 (2000).
41 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42 See PURCELL, supra note 40, at 143; cf Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Ori-
gins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77 (1997) (tracing the rise of
diversity jurisdiction as a vehicle for enforcement of federal rights).
43 Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 582 (plurality opinion).
44 Indeed, recent writing about the opinion has tended to focus on the problem
of determining what the Court held as an illustration of the more general problem of
2004]
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Jackson purported to reaffirm Hepburn as to the meaning of Article
III, 45 but concluded that Congress had power under Article I to create
courts for the adjudication of disputes involving District of Columbia
citizens and power to authorize the Article III courts to hear such
claims. 46 Justice Jackson drew on two different lines of authority in
making this claim. He first noted that congressional power over citi-
zens of the District and their affairs includes the power to create a
legislative court system for the District that enjoys all of the powers of
state courts, as well as the power to conduct Article III business.
47
Congress could empower such courts, Justice Jackson noted, to sum-
mon defendants from throughout the country and compel them to
appear at the suit of District plaintiffs. 48 Congress might instead per-
mit existing federal district courts in states such as Maryland, the
venue of the Tidewater litigation, to hear Article I judicial business
along with their Article III work.
49
Justice Jackson also invoked a number of analogous situations in
which the Court had permitted Congress to assign Article I judicial
business to Article III courts. First, Justice Jackson pointed to claims
involving the United States, claims that the Court had previously de-
scribed as Article I business but had permitted Congress to assign to
Article III courts. Second, Justice Jackson pointed to the bankruptcy
cases, which recognize the power of Congress to assign to federal
courts the adjudication of a variety of state law claims. Justice Jackson
argued that such matters did not arise under federal law and thus
depended on the power of Congress under Article I to ground the
jurisdiction of Article III courts. In the end, Justice Jackson proposed
a fundamental revision of the nature of Article III judicial power, as
his sweeping conclusion makes clear. So long as the dispute was justi-
ciable, and so long as Congress finds it necessary in the exercise of its
Article I powers to provide a tribunal for its resolution, Justice Jack-
son's approach would permit Congress to open the federal courts to
explicating decisions that involve closely divided plurality opinions. See Edward A.
Hartnett, A Matter ofJudgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 123, 135-36
(1999); Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 865, 898 (1998).
45 See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 586-88 (plurality opinion). Jackson emphasized that
the District was unlikely to have attracted the attention of the framers; it was "nonexis-
tent in any form, much less as a state" and was not admitted to statehood either at the
time of ratification or thereafter. Id. at 588 (plurality opinion).
46 See id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
47 See id. (plurality opinion)
48 Id. at 90 (plurality opinion).
49 See id. at 590, 592 (plurality opinion).
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the claim, even where it arises under state law and does not satisfy the
requirements of diversity.
50
Justice Jackson's opinion challenged his colleagues either to
strike down the statute or to rethink theirjurisdictional assumptions.
51
Justices Rutledge and Murphy did neither. Although they joined Jus-
tice Jackson's judgment to uphold the statute, Justices Rudedge and
Murphy did so on the basis that Hepburn had been wrongly decided
and should be overruled. 52 They proposed to reinterpret Article III's
reference to state citizens on the ground that the exclusion of District
citizens was both unjust and discriminatory, and denied to U.S. citi-
zens living in the District access to federal courts that other citizens
and even aliens enjoyed.5 3 Building on this claim of injustice, they
noted that Chief Justice Marshall had premised his claim in Hepburn
on the argument that the Constitution invariably used the word
"State" to mean a formal member of the Union.54 But time had un-
dermined that claim; citizens of the District might not enjoy all of the
political rights of state citizens, but they could fairly claim civil
rights. 55 Thus, a decision to overrule Hepburn would "remove highly
unjust discrimination from a group of our citizens larger than the
population of several states of the Union."56 It was a case about indi-
vidual rights after all, and the solution to the temporal problem was to
reinterpret the limits of Article III to avoid perceived injustice to a
group of citizens in a federal city that did not exist at the time of the
framing.
Although Justices Rutledge and Murphy supplied the votes to sus-
tain the statute, they joined with the remaining four Justices in re-
jecting Justice Jackson's mode of analysis. A variety of common
themes unite the opinions of the six Justices who rejected Justice Jack-
son's theory. First, the dubious six worried about preserving the long-
50 See id. at 600 (plurality opinion). Justice Jackson went on to note the necessary
limits of his formulation, indicating that the plenary power of Congress over the juris-
diction of the federal courts depended on the existence of some delegation of power
to the federal government in Article I. Id. at 602 (plurality opinion). In Tidewater,
congressional power over the citizens of the District met this requirement.
51 By reaffirming the Hepburn limits of diversity, Justice Jackson's opinion con-
fronted the problem of constitutional change. Congress had conferred on District
citizens an equal right of access to federal courts that the Framers of the Constitution
had seemingly denied them. Seeking to uphold a sensible statute, Justice Jackson
proposed a sweeping revision of the theory of the limits of judicial power.
52 See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 617-18 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 617 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 619 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
55 Id. at 623 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 625 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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standing notion that Article III defined the outer limits of federal
court jurisdiction. 57 Second, they simply rejected Justice Jackson's
proposed reinterpretation of recent jurisdictional lore. The Justices
noted that the cases involving the powers of Article III courts to con-
duct Article I business primarily arose within the District itself, and
did not apply to federal district courts elsewhere in the country.
58
They also resisted Justice Jackson's attempt to enlist the support of
cases involving bankruptcy and U.S.-partyjurisdiction; all such matters
were said to present questions that implicated the broad scope of Arti-
cle III and offered no support for an Article I approach.
59
Only Justice Frankfurter delivered an extended peroration
against diversity. Justice Frankfurter described the jurisdiction as ten-
uously founded and unwillingly granted, picking up a theme that
Friendly had sounded in his article some twenty years earlier. 60 As
Justice Frankfurter observed, the jurisdiction failed to implicate any
substantive rights created by Congress, and had been more continu-
ously under fire than any other.61 Although Erie had happily elimi-
nated many of the practical but indefensible reasons for its retention,
Justice Frankfurter saw the retention of diversity jurisdiction as a prod-
uct of legislative inertia.62 Better Congress should repeal the grant
entirely, Justice Frankfurter believed, than extend its pernicious ef-
fects beyond the stated boundaries of Article III as it had done in this
case.
63
To summarize, the opinions in Tidewater offer two solutions to
the problem of jurisdictional boundaries, neither one of which at-
tracted much support from the Court. Justice Jackson's opinion offers
an ambitious reconstruction of the scope of congressional power that
57 See id. at 647, 652 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that Article III marks the
"outer limits of federal judicial power" and emphasizing the "whole history" of the
federal courts in arguing for the preservation of jurisdictional limits); id. at 628-29
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Article III spells out precise boundaries ofjudi-
cial power and reserving all other powers to the states).
58 See id. at 608-11 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (distinguishing O'Donaghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1929), as arising under federal law); id. at 638 (Vinson,
CJ., dissenting) (same).
59 Id. at 611-13 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (distinguishing the bankruptcy cases
as arising under federal law); id. at 652 n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (same).
60 Id. at 650-51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 651 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter did acknowledge that Con-
gress had power to confer substantive rights on the citizens of the District, but noted
that any claims over the enforcement of such rights would arise under the laws of the
United States for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
63 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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would enable Congress to authorize federal judicial resolution of any
dispute over which it enjoys Article I lawmaking authority. But six
Justices rejected Justice Jackson's approach. Similarly, Justices Rut-
ledge and Murphy would have overruled Hepburn, essentially on
grounds of fairness to District citizens, and thus reinterpreted Article
III's proper borders.64 But seven Justices voted to retain Hepburn, un-
fairness and all, and its longstanding interpretation of the scope of
diversity jurisdiction. 65 Although something of a jurisdictional back-
water, Tidewater thus continues to pose the question how the federal
courts can hear disputes that, by hypothesis, exceed the scope of Arti-
cle III and, parenthetically, how best to adapt its terms to a changing
world.
II. THE HART AND WECHSLER ALTERNATIVE
Perhaps the best-known solution to the Tidewater problem ap-
pears in the Hart and Wechsler casebook on federal courts.66 The
casebook's authors begin by expressing doubt about the scope of Con-
gress's powers to expand federal jurisdiction through the exercise of
its powers under Article I. Instead, Hart and Wechsler suggest reli-
ance upon the power of Congress to address the problem with a grant
of protective jurisdiction, relying not upon the diversity grant but on a
form of federal question jurisdiction under Article 111.67 The theory
of protective jurisdiction made its debut during discussions of the le-
gality of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,68 as section 301 of that act pro-
vides for the assertion of federal jurisdiction over contracts between
firms and labor unions.69 Some who viewed Taft-Hartley as a purely
64 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
65 See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 587 (Jackson, Black & Burton,JJ.) (plurality opinion);
id. at 652-53 (Frankfurter & Reed, JJ., dissenting); id. at 645 (Vinson, C.J. & Douglas,
J., dissenting).
66 See HART & WECHSLER I, supra note 11, at 371-72.
67 Id. at 372.
68 See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948); PaulJ. Mishkin, TheFederal "Question" in
the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 189 (1953). Some lower federal court opin-
ions adopted such theories in upholding the jurisdictional grant. See, e.g., Textile
Workers Union v. Am. Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 140 (D. Mass. 1953).
69 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000). Section 301 simply provides that suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization may be brought in federal
district court. The Supreme Court upheld this jurisdictional grant, not by relying
upon the doctrine of protective jurisdiction but by finding that Congress had empow-
ered the federal courts themselves to fashion federal common law to govern the en-
forcement of labor contracts. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957). On the merits of this conclusion, compare Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H.
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jurisdictional statute (one that largely failed to specify substantive fed-
eral rules of decision) defended the statute as an appropriate exercise
of the commerce power of Congress to shift certain disputes into fed-
eral court for resolution in accordance with state law.
Hart and Wechsler suggest that protective jurisdiction might help
to solve the Tidewater problem. As they note, Congress has ample
power to regulate and protect citizens of the District of Columbia.
7°
With these powers over the District and its citizens, Congress could
presumably establish a regime of nationwide service of process to al-
low such citizens to sue outsiders in courts set up within the District.
Moreover, as Justice Jackson noted in his lead opinion, Congress
might well create Article I legislative courts throughout the land in
which citizens of the District could litigate claims against the rest of
the country.71 With these powers, Hart and Wechsler suggest that
Congress might also establish the substantive rules of decision that
would govern the legal relations between District citizens and others.
An action brought to enforce such rights would plainly arise under
the laws of the United States.
This power to fashion rules of substance lies at the center of the
protective jurisdiction solution. Instead of legislating rules of sub-
stance into existence, Hart and Wechsler suggest, Congress might in-
stead simply exercise its protective power over citizens of the District
by providing them with a federal "haven" in which to litigate their
claims against noncitizens. 72 The authors note that certain cases
(those involving bankruptcy estates73) flow into federal court as cases
arising under federal law, even where federal law does not supply the
rule of decision. In effect, then, the greater power to fashion rules of
federal law may carry with it the lesser power simply to shift matters of
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1957) (arguing that there exists no basis for finding such a legislative pur-
pose), with James E. Pfander, Judicial Purpose and the Scholarly Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 243-315 (1991) (defending Justice Douglas's widely criticized
decision that Congress meant federal law to control the determination of labor-con-
tract issues).
70 See HART & WECHSLER I, supra note 11, at 372.
71 Id.
72 Id.; see also Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
73 See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947) (upholding bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion over action governed by state law); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934)
(same). See generally Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2000) (attempt-




federal concern into Article III courts for resolution in accordance
with the body of state law that Erie makes applicable in such cases.
Such a solution to Tidewater presents problems of its own, as the
authors recognize. Justice Frankfurter noted one such problem in his
dissent from the approval of labor-contractjurisdiction in Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills.7 4 There, in an extended consideration of
protective jurisdictional theories, Justice Frankfurter portrayed the
party-based heads of jurisdiction, including the diversity grant itself, as
grants of protective jurisdiction authorizing federal courts to act as
neutral tribunals in applying the law of the states to noncitizens who
might not receive a fair shake in state court.75 Justice Frankfurter ar-
gued that the party-based provisions of Article III exhaust the appro-
priate bases of protective jurisdiction. 76 Hart and Wechsler also note
that protective jurisdiction presents a problem of circularity. If Con-
gress can shift litigation to federal court through a simple grant of
jurisdiction, then it would enjoy "virtually limitless" power to channel
disputes over state law into federal court on the basis of any interest
that implicates congressional power.
77
Although the authors suggest some limits, 78 the doctrine of pro-
tective jurisdiction has a bootstrapping quality that has made it an un-
likely candidate for further development. The doctrine also proposes
to recognize an expansion in congressional power over federal juris-
diction not too dissimilar from the Article I theory thatJustice Jackson
propounded in Tidewater. This absence of limits to the power of Con-
gress presents a serious problem, especially today, at a time when the
Court's struggle to reinvigorate federal restraints on congressional
power in its sovereign immunity and Commerce Clause cases has em-
phasized the need for limits. 79 Whatever the success of its recent line-
drawing efforts, the Court seems quite unlikely to abandon the limits
74 353 U.S. 448, 472-73 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
77 See HART & WECHSLER I, supra note 11, at 372.
78 Most notably, commentators have suggested that one might limit protective
jurisdiction to situations in which Congress has in fact exercised its power by enacting
legislation that at least partly occupies the relevant field. See Mishkin, supra note 68,
at 192-93 (suggesting that jurisdiction in such a case would protect a legislative pro-
gram rather than a particular suitor); cf HART & WECHSLER V, supra note 11, at
847-48 (suggesting a similar limit).
79 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MicH. L. REV. 674, 685-90 (1995)
(noting the importance of limit-setting in the Court's federalism jurisprudence); cf
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1011, 1012-15 (2000) (linking the Court's sovereign immunity cases to
a doctrine of federalism that seeks to limit congressional power).
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of Article III and enable Congress to deploy an expansive version of
federal protective jurisdiction, particularly where such expansion
would come at the expense of state courts. Indeed, in its most recent
opportunity to discuss the issue, in Mesa v. California, the Court point-
edly refrained from relying upon the doctrine of protective jurisdic-
tion to uphold an exercise of federal judicial power.80 The Court's
diffidence in Mesa suggests that protective jurisdiction may not pro-
vide a reliable tool of jurisdictional expansion, and suggests the need
for an alternative account.
III. PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, AND THE SCOPE OF
DIvERsiTY JURISDICTION
This Article proposes an alternative solution to the Tidewater
problem. The solution proposed here has a number of advantages,
but is not entirely without difficulties of its own. One advantage lies in
the linkage suggested between expanded access to federal court and a
founding-era perception that diversity served to secure the enforce-
ment of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. This
Hamiltonian conception of diversity8 l provides a foundation for see-
ing the statute at issue in Tidewater as one that enforces the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Such an understanding connects most
strongly with the opinion of Justices Rutledge and Murphy who saw
the statute as removing an unjust form of discrimination against Dis-
trict citizens.8 2 But rather than an argument for a reinterpretation of
Article III, as in Justice Rutledge's opinion, the claim made here on
behalf of District citizens connects to their status as citizens of the
United States and to the threat of discrimination that they face, in
common with citizens throughout the country, when left to litigate in
a potentially biased state court. Thus, the proffered justification for
the statute would lie in Congress's desire to prevent, under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the biased adjudications that District
citizens might face if left to enforce their state law rights in state
courts.
Apart from supplying a plausible textual hook for Congress's de-
cision to extend the bias-preventing benefits of diversity dockets to
District citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment account of constitu-
tional change corresponds in many of its particulars to the antebellum
experience. While the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
80 489 U.S. 121, 137-38 (1989).
81 For an elaboration of Hamilton's view, see infra note 96.
82 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 79:51940
20041 TIDEWATER PROBLEM 1941
say in so many words that they meant to expand the rights of District
citizens in this particular, antebellum Americans had come to view
access to a federal diversity docket as one of the privileges and immu-
nities of national citizenship. 83 It was precisely that privilege that
Chief Justice Roger Taney had pointedly refused to extend to Dred
Scott on grounds of citizenship 84 and precisely that restrictive view of
the scope of national citizenship that the Fourteenth Amendment
sought to correct. The decision of Congress that the Court upheld in
Tidewater can thus claim stronger roots in the Reconstruction amend-
ments than one might initially suppose.
This part of the Article lays the foundation for a Fourteenth
Amendment account of the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction
on federal courts to protect District citizens from presumptively biased
state courts in litigation with out-of-state citizens. After sketching
Hamilton's early suggestion of the linkage between diversity and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, this Part explores the manner in
which Congress codified diversity jurisdiction in 1789. It concludes
that Hamilton's "subtle bias" account provides a much better explana-
tion of the early contours of the jurisdiction than the idea of simple
diversity.
A. Hamilton and the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of different states was,
as Justice Frankfurter noted in Tidewater, tenuously founded and un-
willingly granted. Anti-Federalists attacked the jurisdiction in the de-
bates over the ratification of the Constitution, seeing it as an invasion
of the role of the state judiciaries. 85 Federalists replied that the juris-
diction would provide outsiders with an unbiased alternative to the
state courts.86 Despite what Henry Friendly famously described as the
comparative "apathy" of this Federalist defense,8 7 the states ratified
Article III and Congress promptly included grants of diversity jurisdic-
tion in the Judiciary Act of 1789,88 where it has remained in the face
of a succession of repeal movements.89
83 See infra note 177 (collecting authorities).
84 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04 (1856).
85 See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L.
REv. 483, 489-92 (1928).
86 Id. at 492.
87 Id. at 487.
88 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
89 One wave of opposition crested in 1932, with the failure of the Progressives to
secure repeal of ajurisdiction that they saw as supporting a federal judicial lawmaking
role that benefited corporate interests. See PURCELL, supra note 40, at 143. Another
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The progressive critique of diversity jurisdiction has drained the
jurisdiction of much of its apparent justification. 90 Consider the neu-
tral tribunal account that Friendly dismissed as apathetic nearly sev-
enty-five years ago. On this account, federal tribunals offer out-of-
state litigants a neutral forum for the adjudication of their disputes
with in-state citizens, and thus avoid the problems of bias that might
otherwise attend the adjudication of such disputes by the state
courts. 9a But surely, as Friendly noted, state court bias against out-of-
state citizens no longer presents a serious problem, if indeed it ever
did. The rise of national markets and a more mobile population have
made the ties of state citizenship a good deal weaker than they were in
the republic's early years and have reduced the threat of bias against
outlanders. Moreover, Erie leaves the federal courts with relatively few
tools to combat such bias, even if it still existed. 92 To be sure, federal
courts can invalidate state rules that overtly discriminate against out-
siders, deploying the federal Constitution and its manifold prohibi-
tions against such localism. But they perform this work in tandem
with their state court colleagues, and in the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion over federal question cases; they have no power to ignore other-
wise applicable (i.e., constitutional) state law simply on the basis that
the dispute involves diverse citizens. This portrait of federal diversity
courts as forums for the application of state law that they do little to
shape or influence seems hard-pressed to explain the jurisdiction's
stubborn resistance to repeal or restriction.
One intriguing, alternative account with solid historical anteced-
ents links diversity jurisdiction and the need for an impartial tribunal
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitu-
wave came in the 1960s, after Justice Brandeis's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins had drained much of the life out of diversity jurisdiction by requiring fed-
eral courts to apply state law as the rule of decision in such litigation. See Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In recent years, the Judicial Conference of
the United States has joined the critics' ranks, supporting proposals to cut back on
diversity or repeal it altogether. See COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 29-30
(1995) (setting forth proposals to curtail diversity jurisdiction).
90 For the details of the critique, see PURCELL, supra note 40, at 66-67 (contend-
ing that Brandeis's opinion in Erie sought to cut back on the scope of corporate access
to diversity dockets and the federal judicial lawmaking power that such courts enjoyed
under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
91 See Friendly, supra note 85, at 492.
92 Recall that in Erie the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts must apply state
law to diversity cases. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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tion.9  The clause declares that the "citizens of each State shall be
93 The Federalist critique of the Articles of Confederation provides an appropri-
ate introduction to the origins of the diversity jurisdictional grant in Article III and its
connection to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. On the Federalist
account, the crowning failure of the Articles of Confederation was its requirement
that the central government rely upon the states to carry national measures into ef-
fect. As Hamilton explained, state particularism had everywhere produced a "strong
predilection in favor of local objects" and a disregard of federal obligations. THE FED-
ERALIST No. 15, at 97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Hamilton
thus argued in favor of a power on the part of the central government to carry its
agency to the "persons of the citizens" without reliance upon state intermediaries.
THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton). As Hamilton elabo-
rated, "[The national government] must itself be empowered to employ the arm of
the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national
authority must be manifested through the medium of the Courts of Justice." Id. To
Hamilton, and other Federalists, the key solution to the imbecility of the Confedera-
tion was the ratification of a Constitution that would make existing federal obligations
enforceable against the citizens themselves, through the medium of federal courts. See
id.
One such underenforced (con)federal obligation was the interstate comity provi-
sion of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, which read as follows:
[T] he free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugi-
tives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each state shall have
free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, imposi-
tions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that
such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property
imported into any state ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781). Although the interstate comity pro-
vision did not appear in the formal terms of the Virginia Plan of the Constitution, see
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVErrrION OF 1787, at 20-22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND], the Committee of Detail added Article IV to its draft of the
Constitution, which required each state to afford those from elsewhere "all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states," and the convention accepted the
addition as a matter of no controversy whatever. See 2 FARRAND, supra, at 173-74, 443
(reporting lopsided approval of the provision in convention and noting opposition
from South Carolina's delegate, who argued for the inclusion of a provision in favor
of the right of slave owners to travel with their slaves).
Taken from Blackstone and the territorial accession treaties of the day, the lan-
guage of the precursor to the Constitution's own Privileges and Immunities Clause
sought to secure an economic union of the states by assuring citizens everywhere the
rights to travel, and to participate on an equal basis in the commercial life of the
nation. See infra note 95. Such free commercial participation required that out-of-
state citizens enjoy ights to own property, and enforce their contracts on an equal
basis with in-state citizens. In theory, such a right of free participation foreclosed
states from adopting laws that would discriminate against noncitizens. It also assured
nonresident merchants and creditors a right of access to state tribunals for the en-
forcement of the debts of in-state citizens.
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entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens in the sev-
eral States. '94 Famously ambiguous, the clause offers an assurance of
equal treatment to in-state and out-of-state citizens alike. In light of its
territorial accession connotations, 95 one can reasonably read the
clause as an assurance that outsiders are to enjoy the same right as
insiders to own property, enforce their contracts, and secure the en-
Under the Articles of Confederation, enforcement of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, like all other judicial functions that fell outside the limited jurisdiction of
the national court of appeals in prize cases, had been left entirely in the hands of the
state courts. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 2 (U.S. 1781) (describing
Congress's function as the "last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences ...
between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes
whatever"); id. art. II (reserving to the states "every power, jurisdiction, and right" that
was not "expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled"). Under
the new Constitution, which uncontroversially carried forward a somewhat stream-
lined version of the old privileges and immunities clause, federal courts were to have
a clearer enforcement role. Article III provided for the creation of one Supreme
Court and authorized Congress to establish additional inferior federal courts to hear
claims within federal jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III also set forth a
provisional grant of appellate jurisdiction that extended to cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Id. § 2, cl. 1. Under this initial
distribution ofjurisdiction, violations by the state courts of any of the prohibitions in
the Constitution would give rise, at a minimum, to the possibility of appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court of the United States. In addition, Congress might give the
lower federal courts jurisdiction in the first instance or on appeal to remedy state
violations of the Constitution. Either way-this was Friendly's essential point-state
violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause would amply support an assertion
of federal judicial power.
94 U.S. CONST. art. W, § 2, cl. 1.
95 The language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause resembles the assur-
ances of privileges and immunities that appeared in many treaties of the day regard-
ing territorial accession. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 167-69 (1998) (giving examples of treaties that gave such assur-
ances). Interestingly, one finds a rather close correspondence between such treaties
and the expansion of diversity jurisdiction following the ratification of the Louisiana
Purchase. The treaty with France that sealed the Purchase declared that "[t]he inhab-
itants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States,
and admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of the Federal constitu-
tion, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the
United States." Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Repub-
lic, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, art. III, 8 Stat. 200, 202. This assurance of "rights, advan-
tages, and immunities" may have helped to persuade Congress to create a federal
district court for the Territory of Orleans and to invest that court with jurisdiction
over diversity claims. It may also have persuaded the Court to take an expansive view
of the scope of congressional power. See Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-38
(1810) (upholding power of Congress to confer jurisdiction on federal district court
for the Territory of Orleans in cases involving citizens of the territories, not just those
involving citizens of a state).
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forcement of their rights through the courts. The clause's commer-
cial overtones and its emphasis on enforcement of rights at common
law explain why prominent supporters of the Constitution, including
James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton, 96 argued that diversity juris-
diction would "secure the full effect" of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause by enabling outsiders to litigate common law questions of con-
tract, tort and property on the dockets of impartial federal tribunals.
97
Yet Hamilton's Article IV account of diversity jurisdiction has
seemed to many to suffer from insuperable difficulties. To begin with,
96 Immediately after describing the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the "basis
of the union," Hamilton explained the importance of diversity jurisdiction to uphold-
ing this clause:
And if it be ajust principle that every government ought to possess the means of
executing its own provision by its own authority, it will follow, that in order to the
inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to
which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought
to preside in all cases in which one state or its citizens are opposed to an-
other state or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provi-
sion against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction
should be committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments,
will be likely to be impartial between the different states and their citizens,
and which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to
feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 93, at 537-38 (Alexander Hamilton). For Hamil-
ton, then, diversity operated as a jurisdictional predicate for "the inviolable mainte-
nance" of the principle of equality among the citizens of different states in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
97 A surprisingly broad, and well informed, range of observers appear to have
shared Hamilton's understanding of the linkage between diversity and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. See 3JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1684, at 561-62 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (indicating
that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts operated "to carry into effect some
of the privileges and immunities conferred, and some of the prohibitions upon states
expressly declared, in the constitution" and illustrating the point by emphasizing the
ability of the national tribunals to avoid the application of state legislation that
"grant[s] unconstitutional preferences to its own citizens"); 4 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTI-
TUTION 251 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (quotingJames Monroe's
explanation that an outsider should not be forced to "seek redress in the tribunals of
that state, wherein he received the injury[;] he might not obtain it, from the influence
of his adversary"). In the Virginia ratification debates, Edmund Pendleton noted that
the diversity jurisdiction might be left to state tribunals, particularly in view of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause which he evidently saw as creating a federal right to
appellate review of discriminatory state laws. However, Pendleton nonetheless de-
fended diversity jurisdiction on the basis that bias in state courts might evade effective
appellate review. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 549 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott 1836) (quoting Edmund Pendleton's defense of diversity).
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause creates a federal right in all citi-
zens to equal treatment at the hands of other states. A state that
abridges such a right has violated the Constitution and such a viola-
tion gives rise to federal question jurisdiction, either in a federal court
of first instance (to review discriminatory action on the part of the
state executive) or in the Supreme Court (to review state judicial dis-
crimination). Thus, as Henry Friendly noted in dismissing the Article
IV account as "specious,"98 violations of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause will themselves ground the jurisdiction of the federal courts
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Moreover, as Profes-
sor Wright noted,9 9 the Supreme Court has summarily rejected the
argument that citizens of the United States enjoy a right, under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, to a federal diversity docket. 100 In-
deed, as Professor John Hart Ely reminded us, the Clause does not
bind Congress,' 0 ' and thus could not well provide individuals with a
right of access to a federal diversity tribunal that would trump a fed-
eral legislative restriction. That Congress enjoys plenary control over
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, including jurisdiction
based upon diversity, seems in the end to undermine the notion that
diversity might serve as a tool for the enforcement of rights under
Article IV.
B. Understanding Hamilton's Account
These problems diminish in size, however, with a more complete
understanding of what Hamilton may have had in mind in describing
diversity as a jurisdiction meant to secure the full effect of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause against all "evasion and subterfuge." As
Hamilton knew, a state stopping short of facial discrimination might
develop at the trial level certain customs or practices that, though fair
in form, nonetheless disadvantage outsiders. State juries might give
voice to local prejudice, state judges might comment unfavorably on
the evidence or deny the admission of certain testimony, and state
appraisals of property tendered in satisfaction of a judgment might
operate in fact to produce a less than fully compensatory award. Such
subtle forms of discrimination, to the extent that they disproportion-
ately targeted out-of-state citizens, may have seemed inconsistent with
the spirit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and its assurance of
98 Friendly, supra note 85, at 492 n.44.
99 See WRicHT & KANE, supra note 19, at 150.
100 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. South Acres Dev. Co., 434 U.S. 236, 238 (1978).




evenhanded justice. Yet federal courts would find them extremely dif-
ficult to remedy through the exercise of federal question jurisdiction,
either in the first instance or on appeal. We might understand diver-
sity of citizenship jurisdiction as operating to address these subtle
problems by providing likely victims with access to an alternative
forum.
To see a role for diversity in enforcing its provisions, one must
understand something about the constitutional protection of privi-
leges and immunities in Article IV. Like many provisions of the Con-
stitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause assumes that the states
of the Union have well functioning judicial systems in which the com-
mon law, as modified to fit local conditions, provides the measure of
the citizen's rights and obligations. The common law defined the
rights of individuals to enter into contracts, to own real property, and
to enforce their rights through actions brought in the local tribunals.
The common law also provided writs of habeas corpus to test the legal-
ity of confinement, and to assure access to bail in appropriate cases.
Common law thus promised judicial protection for the rights to life,
liberty, and property that the founding generation viewed as their
birthright.
With its focus on contract and property rights, the clause stopped
well short of guaranteeing out-of-state citizens all of the political rights
associated with full in-state citizenship. While the Constitution as-
signed Congress the power to fashion uniform rules for the naturaliza-
tion of aliens, and thus nationalized citizenship to that extent, it left
the states free to determine the conditions on which the newly arrived
citizens of another state might obtain full state citizenship. 10 2 Often,
the states required new arrivals to reside in the state for a period of
time, and take an oath of allegiance to the state. So, as the early deci-
sions noted, the clause might confer a limited species of national citi-
zenship on outsiders, by enabling them to enforce contract rights and
property rights in state courts, but did not assure them full political
rights to vote and hold office in a particular state. 1 0 3 Thus, much the
102 See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY 137-52 (1997).
103 See Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827) (noting that the privileges
and immunities of citizens apply upon "removal from one state into another" and that
such removal makes them "citizens of the adopted State without naturalization [and
with] a right to sue and be sued as citizens," but explaining that "this privilege is
qualified and not absolute, for they cannot enjoy the right of suffrage or of eligibility
to office, without such term of residence as shall be prescribed by the constitution
and laws of the State"); Murray v. M'Carty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 393, 398 (1811) (acknowl-
edging that the Privileges and Immunities Clause gives the individual a right to own
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same distinction between civil rights and political rights that was to
crop up in debates over the Fourteenth Amendment had also shaped
the antebellum understanding of Article IV.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause thus focuses on assuring
outsiders free access to well functioning common law systems and to
the rights that they secure. Under the classic antebellum formulation
in Corfield v. Coryell, the Privileges and Immunities Clause assures each
citizen the right to travel through and reside in any state and to pur-
sue certain "fundamental" economic ends while there, including
"trade, agricultural, and professional pursuits."1 0 4 To make good on
this promise, the Privileges and Immunities Clause forecloses the
states from treating outsiders differently from insiders at least with re-
spect to those matters deemed to come within the protective ambit of
the clause. Thus, as Justice Story explained in his Commentaries, the
clause prohibits the states from treating the citizens of other states as
aliens, and from denying them the right to take and hold real prop-
erty in the state. 10 5 Or, as others have explained, the clause guaran-
tees a citizen's right to "remove"-that is, to move, from one state to
another-with the full local measure of protection for any property
taken to or purchased in the new state.' 0 6 Or, as still others ex-
plained, the clause empowers nonresident creditors to invoke com-
mon law remedies to collect debts owed by local debtors, free from
lands outside his state of citizenship, but noting that an out-of-stater does not enjoy
"those rights, which, from the very nature of society and of government, belong exclu-
sively to citizens of that state," such as "the rights of election and of representation");
Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797) (defining privileges and immu-
nities clause as protecting the right of citizens to "acquir[e] and hold[ ] real as well as
personal property" and requiring that "property shall be protected and secured by the
laws of the state, in the same manner as the property of the citizens of the state," but
noting that the clause does not confer "full and comprehensive" rights of citizenship,
and in particular does not mean "the right of election, the right of holding offices,
the right of being elected").
104 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
105 3 STORY, supra note 97, § 1800, at 674-75; see also Abbot, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 92
(stating that citizens who have removed to a new state shall enjoy privileges and im-
munities and "they shall not be deemed aliens").
106 See Abbot, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 92 (upholding the right of a woman to "remove"
from New Hampshire to Massachusetts, following her abandonment by her husband,
and to enjoy full rights to enter into contracts, own property, and sue or be sued
without regard to the rule of coverture). Obviously, a state's right to ban slavery
within its borders could not coexist with an untrammeled right in southerners to re-
move to the free states and retain a property interest in their slaves. But a free state,
in denying the newly arrived southerner a continuing property in human beings,




any discriminating barriers that states might wish to erect to bar such
litigation.' 0 7 In all of these instances, the clause operates to foreclose
states from discriminating against the out-of-state citizen as to matters
of contract enforcement and property ownership.
Such a conception of the rights of noncitizens did more than rule
out discrimination; it seemed to assure noncitizens equal access to
state court enforcement of rights in accordance with common law.
Thus, the Corfield court went on to define the privileges and immuni-
ties of state citizenship to include "[t]he right of a citizen ... to claim
the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain ac-
tions of any kind in the courts of the state; [and] to take, hold and
dispose of property.'u0 8 This principle of equal access to the rights
afforded individuals at common law-the common law core of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause-does much to explain diversity ju-
risdiction. Diversity offers those who would presumptively suffer Arti-
cle IV violations-out-of-state citizens-access to an alternative
tribunal for the evenhanded enforcement of rights at common law.
Diversity thus secures the state law core of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause not by policing the quality of justice in state courts but by
providing out-of-state citizens and aliens with a redundant or overlap-
ping federal tribunal for the pursuit of claims against insiders.
One can best understand the enforcement problems that gave
rise to diversity by considering a simple hypothetical that underscores
the corrective limits of federal question jurisdiction. Suppose a New
Jersey creditor wishes to collect a debt from a citizen of New York, but
faces a New York law that expressly forbids out-of-state creditors from
bringing suit in New York courts. Federal question jurisdiction might
solve this sort of problem; presumably, the New Jersey plaintiff could
attempt to invoke New York process, suffer a dismissal and appeal
through the state courts to the Supreme Court of the United States,
seeking an invalidation of a facially discriminatory law.' 0 9 Alterna-
tively, the NewJersey plaintiff might (at least today) bring an action in
federal district court to enjoin the state from invoking the rule as a
barrier to his debt-collection action. In either instance, federal ques-
tion jurisdiction would appear to provide a satisfactory remedy, so
107 See Campbell, 3 H. & McH. at 554 (noting that the clause may also mean that, as
creditors, out-of-state citizens "shall be on the same footing with the state creditor, in
the payment of the debts of a deceased debtor").
108 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
109 See, e.g., Conner v. Elliot, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 594 (1855) (entertaining
appellate jurisdiction on the basis of a claim under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, but concluding on the merits that no such violation had been established;
finding no improper discrimination).
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long as the New York state courts otherwise offered a well functioning
tribunal for the enforcement of rights based upon state law.
But federal question jurisdiction would perform much less effec-
tively if, as the Framers of Article III feared, the state judges and juries
were seen as prone to engage in subtle forms of discrimination against
out-of-state citizens. For starters, subtle forms of discrimination may
be quite difficult to isolate and identify as such for purposes of seeking
federal relief. The process of litigation demands a special combina-
tion of expert knowledge and tenacity and carries the ever-present
possibility that minor missteps and misfortune may result in a loss of
one's claims. Given the complexity of the process and the inherent
risks of failure, rooting out instances of discrimination on the part of
state courts and making them a part of the record may prove quite
difficult. Even if one were to succeed in showing prejudice, moreover,
federal judicial intervention might come too late to help, as Madison
explained with customary pithiness in explaining why appellate review
could not remedy a denial of federal rights: "What was to be done
after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed
direction of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undi-
rected jury. To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no
purpose." 1 0 Even assuming (somewhat heroically) that an appellant
could make the jury's bias a part of the record and thus preserve it for
appellate review, Madison suggests that appellate review would not
provide effective relief. A remand would simply put the appellant
back before the biased state court and jury that had rendered the
tainted verdict in the first place, and further back in the queue of
creditors.
Just as appellate review seems hard-pressed to remedy subtle
state-court discrimination, the prospects for securing relief in federal
trial courts on the basis of a posited state court violation of privileges
and immunities seem quite remote. Suppose our NewJersey creditor
initiates a claim in New York state court to collect the debt, and suffers
a subtle form of discrimination. Established principles of federal-state
comity, as expressed in the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793,111 and in the
more modern doctrine of equitable restraint, forbid federal courts
from enjoining a violation of federal constitutional rights committed
110 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 93, at 124 (statement ofJames Madison) (arguing in
favor of inferior federal courts).
111 For the current text of the Anti-injunction Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
On its operation to prevent intervention in most pending state civil proceedings, see
Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 289, 295-97.
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in the course of an ongoing state court proceeding. 1 l2 Moreover, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal trial courts from con-
ducting the functional equivalent of appellate review of such state
court proceedings both before and after they have run their course. 113
Finally, preclusive effect attaches to the state court disposition after it
becomes final, and forecloses any attempt to relitigate the issues in a
subsequent proceeding in federal court. 114
Apart from these doctrines ofjudicial federalism, of which Hamil-
ton and the Framers of Article III obviously knew nothing, federal
trial courts have historically struggled to enforce federal constitutional
or statutory rights to evenhanded state court recognition of rights
based upon state law. One problem stems from the difficulty of mak-
ing federal jurisdiction turn on the inadequacy of state court
processes. Federal courts have struggled in such cases both in defin-
ing the jurisdictional trigger of state court inadequacy and in deciding
what to do with the case once it arrives in federal court. 115 The civil
rights removal statute represents one illustration of the problem of
defining an appropriate trigger. 116 Once the case comes to federal
112 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin a
criminal prosecution, claiming that the criminal syndicalism statute under which he
was indicted violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 39. The Court rejected the
claim, holding that federal district courts should ordinarily abstain from considering
suits to enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. Id. at 53. Subsequent decisions
extend Younger abstention to federal court applications for declaratory relief, see Sam-
uels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971), and to federal actions still in their early
stages when state criminal proceedings were filed. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
348-50 (1975). Equitable restraint applies, of course, to pending state criminal pro-
ceedings, and would not necessarily prevent federal interference in a civil matter,
such as a debt proceeding.
113 The doctrine limits the jurisdiction of the federal district courts and takes its
name from the leading cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). On its growth in
recent years, see HART & WECHSLER V, supra note 11, at 1436-41.
114 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (Founda-
tion Press 2001).
115 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 195, 14 Stat. 558, 559 (entitling both the
plaintiff and the defendant to remove the action from state to federal court upon a
showing of local prejudice or improper influence). On the interpretive difficulties
with the statute, see C. & G. Cooper v. Condon, 15 Kan. 430 (1875) (rejecting suffi-
ciency of affidavit in support of removal under statute). See generally JOHN F. DILLON,
REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS §§ 24-25 (5th ed., St.
Louis, Central Law Journal Co. 1889) (explaining the background of and justifica-
tions for the Act).
116 On the difficulties with the civil rights removal jurisdiction, which authorizes
removal when a person "cannot enforce" civil rights in state court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443(1), see Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975) (refusing to permit
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court, it raises the question of what remedy to fashion. May the fed-
eral court simply correct the error in state process and send the case
back for further proceedings, a course of action that may the leave the
problem of ongoing discrimination largely unremedied? Or must the
federal court retain the case and proceed to adjudicate the rights of
the parties as an unbiased state tribunal would have done? Predicat-
ing federal jurisdiction on a finding of state-court inadequacy thus
represents a messy basis on which to proceed.
117
Diversity jurisdiction avoids many of the problems associated with
litigation to establish subtle state violations of federal rights in either
state or federal court. By making party identity the test ofjurisdiction,
diversity avoids any official inquiry into problems with the quality of
justice in state court. By obviating such inquiries, diversity offers a
cleanerjurisdictional test and one that avoids any direct clash between
the state and federal courts over quality of justice issues. To be sure,
in the task of calibrating the scope of the jurisdiction, Congress and
the Supreme Court must decide how broadly to write and interpret
diversity statutes, and issues of state court competency may inform
such determinations. But such assessments will likely focus on institu-
tional impressions of the state systems as a whole, rather than on an
assessment of the adequacy of particular courts in particular states.
Instead of requiring federal decisionmakers to assess the strained
quality of state court justice, diversity simply creates an alternative en-
removal on the ground that a showing of likely bias is not sufficient to support re-
moval; finding that petitioner must show a denial of rights in a formal statement of
state law); and Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 803-04 (1966) (refusing to permit
removal while distinguishing between legal deprivations of civil rights, which support
removal, and customary or subtle policies of discrimination by judge or jury, which do
not).
117 In addition to problems of complexity, a jurisdictional test that focuses on the
inadequacy of state court processes invites the creation of a record of state judicial
bias. Cases arising under the Tax Injunction Acts, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and civil rights
removal, id. § 1443, offer an illustration. By linking access to a federal docket to a
showing that the plaintiff cannot enforce her rights in state courts, both statutes invite
litigants to disparage the quality of the state courts. See California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1982) (considering challenge to the adequacy of state
court remedies in cases involving a federal attack on state taxes); Georgia v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780, 782-83 (1966) (considering a removal petition based upon a claim that
Georgia courts practiced racial discrimination). To be sure, the state courts have
often richly deserved the critical reviews that they may receive in such litigation. But
one can nonetheless understand why Congress and the federal courts might prefer to
construct a body of jurisdictional law that would avoid the repeated public airing of
such laundry. Perhaps as a result, both Georgia v. Rachel and California v. Grace Breth-
ren adopt rules that make it difficult for petitioners to reach federal court by disparag-
ing the adequacy of state remedies.
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try point into the federal system and relies upon the parties them-
selves to assess state court competence. Our regime of concurrent
jurisdiction does have costs, as overlapping court systems provide liti-
gants with a rich array of choices among judges, courts and bodies of
law, and encourage forum shopping. But a system that provides
broad opportunities for forum shopping also places jurisdictional
wrangling at the level of lawyers' tactics rather than at that of formal
judicial decisionmaking. Lawyers thus make the choices about the
competence of state and federal courts based on their own expert
knowledge of the tribunals in question and with the incentive pro-
vided by the usual desire to secure the best possible result for their
clients. While the system of concurrent jurisdiction avoids any re-
quirement that the lawyers in question actually prove their intuition
about the relative competence of the two court systems, we can learn
something about their perception of those questions by watching
them express their jurisdictional inclinations through their behavior
in the selection of available forums.
This preference for overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction has
been a part of our federal system from the beginning. The Senator
from Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth, explained as much in a letter to a
constituent that he wrote during the drafting of the Judiciary Act of
1789. In defending the creation of a separate federal court system,
Ellsworth explained that without such courts
there must be many appeals or writs of error from the supreme
courts of the States, which by placing them in a Subordinate situa-
tion, & Subjecting their discussions to frequent reversals, would
probably more hurt their feelings.., than to divide the ground with
them at first & leave it optional with the parties entitled to federal
jurisdiction, where the causes are of considerable magnitude to take
their remedy in which line of courts they pleased.' 1 8
In proposing to divide the work between state courts and lower fed-
eral courts as an original matter, Ellsworth defended a system of con-
current jurisdiction that defines judicial federalism today. Parties
retain an option to choose between the two court systems in a wide
range of instances, and the Court has sharply curtailed its review of
state court decisions.
118 Letter from Oliver Ellsworth, U.S. Senator, to Richard Law (Aug. 4, 1789),
quoted in Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise
or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY. ESSAYS ON THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 13, 20 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
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C. Codification of a Bias Approach in the Judiciary Act of 1789
If the Framers of the diversity grant in Article III of the Constitu-
tion worried about subtle bias on the part of state courts, much the
same concern appears to have informed the codification of diversity
jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.119 To see how provisions of
the Act selectively operated to provide out-of-state citizens a somewhat
limited right to choose a federal forum, consider the example of a
dispute between citizens of New York and Virginia. Section 11 of the
Act would have permitted the New York citizen to bring suit against
the Virginia defendant in a federal circuit court in Virginia. 120 In thus
supplying a federal alternative, the Act regarded the Virginia state
court as presumptively biased against the New York plaintiff. If, by
contrast, the Virginia citizen brought suit in the first instance against
the New York citizen in Virginia state court, section 12 of the Act au-
thorized the New Yorker to remove the action to the federal circuit
court of Virginia. 12' In both instances, the law permitted the New
Yorker to opt into federal court as an alternative to litigation with a
Virginian in Virginia state courts.
While the Act thus gave the out-of-state litigant a federal option,
several features of the Act operated to limit access to a federal tribunal
even though the threshold requirement of diverse citizenship was sat-
isfied. To begin with, the right of original access to a federal tribunal
came into play only where one of the two opposing parties was litigat-
ing in the state of her own citizenship and would have enjoyed a pre-
sumptive home-court advantage in state court. In our example, then, a
diversity docket was made available to the out-of-state citizen as an al-
ternative to state court litigation in either New York or Virginia. But
the parties could not litigate in federal court, either originally or on
removal,1 22 if suit was contemplated, say, within the borders of Rhode
Island.123 One can probably best understand such a restriction as re-
flecting a recognition that the Rhode Island state courts, at least in
119 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
120 See id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78 (providing for original jurisdiction in the circuit courts
where the amount in controversy exceeded $500 and the "suit is between a citizen of
the State where the suit is brought, and the citizen of another State").
121 See id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 97 (providing for removal of actions where the matter in
dispute exceeds $500 and the suit was commenced in a state court "by a citizen of the
state in which suit is brought against the citizen of another state").
122 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
123 See Kitchen v. Strawbridge, 14 F. Cas. 692, 693 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 7854)
(finding diversity jurisdiction unavailable in a Pennsylvania federal court in a case
where there was diversity between citizens from Massachusetts and Georgia); White v.
Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015, (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547) (refusing to assert diversity
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suits between New York and Virginia litigants, were unlikely to favor
either party in the subtle ways that would justify the provision of an
alternative docket.
Removal, moreover, was available only for those defendants who
were sued away from their home. As noted above, the Act permitted a
New York citizen, if made a defendant in a Virginia state court action,
to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction by removing the action to fed-
eral court. 124 But the Act limited removal to defendants who were
out-of-state citizens. As a consequence, if the Virginia plaintiff sued
the New Yorker in the New York state courts, the Act gave the defen-
dant no right of removal. Here again, the Judiciary Act appears to
have provided the New York defendant with a right to opt into federal
court only if sued before a presumptively biased (Virginia) state court
system. Just as the removal statute does today, 125 the Act of 1789 re-
fused to make the federal option available to a New York defendant
sued in her own state court system.
The removal provisions highlight the Act's more general decision
to let the presumptively disadvantaged out-of-state litigants themselves
choose between the federal tribunal and a possibly biased state court.
In general, the Act required the out-of-state citizen to take some af-
firmative action to secure the federal docket. If the out-of-state citizen
chose the state court, either by filing there originally or by failing to
remove the action, the Act treated the presumption of bias as rebut-
ted, and foreclosed access to federal court. 126 Thus, the venerable
rule of defendant unanimity, which remains a part of removal law to-
day, 127 grew out of the Act's decision to make federal diversityjurisdic-
jurisdiction in a Rhode Island federal court over dispute between citizens of New York
and Virginia).
124 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (removal provision applies only
where suit is brought by an in-state citizen against an out-of-state citizen).
125 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (refusing to permit removal in diversity cases
where the defendant has been sued in the defendant's state of citizenship).
126 If, for example, a New York plaintiff chose to sue a Virginia citizen in Virginia
state court, thereby expressing confidence in the fairness of the Virginia tribunal, the
Virginia defendant could not remove to federal court. Similarly, if the Virginia plain-
tiff brought suit against two or more out-of-state defendants, early cases interpreting
the Act required all of the defendants to join in removing the action to federal court.
See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND PRACTICE GOVERNING THE
REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS 114 n.100 (St. Paul,
West 1898) (collecting cases). If one of the defendants failed to join in the removal,
and thus expressed confidence in the fairness of the state court, federal jurisdiction
was unavailable even to the diverse parties who preferred the federal tribunal.
127 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 19, at 244 n.9.
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tion available primarily to those out-of-state parties who affirmatively
chose the federal option.
12s
In light of the Act's otherwise consistent decisions to place the
choice between state and federal court in the hands of the out-of-state
party, its provision for an in-state plaintiff to invoke federal diversity
jurisdiction seems somewhat anomalous. Section 11 of the Act per-
mitted a New York citizen to bring suit in a New York federal court
against a Virginia citizen, even though the logic of the state bias ac-
count suggests that the New York plaintiff had no cognizable interest
in a federal alternative to New York state court. 12 9 Such in-state plain-
tiff invocations of diversity jurisdiction remain controversial today, for
much the same reason, and have been the subject of a variety of re-
peal or curtailment proposals. 30 At the time of the Act, however, the
practical consequences of such in-state plaintiff invocations of diver-
sityjurisdiction would have been a good deal more limited than today,
in light of the then prevailing restrictions on the territorial jurisdic-
tional power of the New York courts.131
A New York federal court, sitting in diversity in 1790, could assert
judicial or personal jurisdiction over a Virginia defendant only in
cases where the defendant was "found," or personally served with pro-
cess, in New York or where the dispute involved title to real property
in New York. 132 Before the advent of long-arm statutes in the twenti-
128 On the rule of defendant unanimity, see id. at 244 nn.9-12.
129 See supra note 120.
130 For a criticism of in-state plaintiff diversity jurisdiction, see WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 19, at 155. For its proposed repeal, see AM. LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 123-25 (1969).
131 The principles of territorial jurisdiction in place in the early nineteenth cen-
tury permitted plaintiffs to serve process (through capias or arrest) while the defen-
dant was present within the territory of the state. See generally James Weinstein, The
Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90
VA. L. REV. 169, 191-99 (2004) (tracing the origins and early operation of the rule
requiring service of process within the territory as the predicate for judicial jurisdic-
tion). In addition, states had begun to experiment with the process of foreign attach-
ment by which the plaintiff caused the state to seize the defendant's property, and
used the threat of forfeiture to compel the defendant to enter an appearance. See
Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 610 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134). CircuitJustice
Story concluded that such foreign attachment jurisdiction was available in federal
court only where the defendant was otherwise amenable to suit in the state as an
inhabitant or resident. See id. at 615.
132 The Judiciary Act of 1789 itself declared that, in civil actions, the federal courts
were to issue original process to inhabitants of the United States only within the dis-
trict (or state) where they resided or were found at the time of service of process. See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. No less a figure than Justice Story
declared that these prohibitions against issuance of process beyond the boundaries of
1956 [VOL. 79:5
TIDEWATER PROBLEM
eth century, and the increased mobility they signal, New York plain-
tiffs would have had but few opportunities to sue Virginia defendants
in New York courts. In-state plaintiff jurisdiction would have applied
most frequently to situations where the out-of-state defendant owned
an interest in in-state property,1 33 had an ongoing business relation-
ship to the in-state forum,13 4 or consented to the jurisdiction of New
York. 135 In-state plaintiff jurisdiction may have reflected a desire to
make in personam litigation somewhat more geographically conve-
nient by permitting the New York plaintiff to offer a Virginia defen-
dant a New York federal court alternative to litigation in Virginia.136
the district simply restated the principles of territoriality by which the federal courts
were bound in any case. See Picquet, 19 F. Cas. at 611-12.
133 See, e.g., Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 288, 288-89 (1809) (illustrating
federal judicial reliance on the presence of property within the district to justify an
assertion of in rem jurisdiction that necessarily obliged defendants claiming an inter-
est in the property to appear and litigate).
134 See Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 348 (1850).
135 See, e.g., Gracie v. Palmer, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 699, 699-700 (1823) (treating the
Act's territorial limits on federal issuance of process as subject to waiver through de-
fendant's entry of a voluntary appearance and refusing to treat such restrictions as
limits on the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction); Logan, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at
288-89 (illustrating the principle that a defendant, though served with process
outside the federal district, might nonetheless consent to personal jurisdiction within
the district by entering a voluntary appearance).
136 The possibility that an out-of-state defendant might have agreed to consent to
the personal jurisdiction of the New York federal courts may help to explain in-state
plaintiff diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789. A New York citizen could
have sued a Virginia defendant in New York state court, and hoped to perfect service
of process on the Virginia defendant either by personal service in the state or by
consent. On the realistic prospect of such a consensual or voluntary appearance, see
Harison v. Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 657, 658 (C.C.D.N.J. 1818) (No. 6140) (describing the
statute as meant to offer the nonresident defendant an opportunity to consent to the
personal jurisdiction of the federal circuit court so long as the requisite diversity of
citizenship be established). Yet Virginia defendants may have been understandably
reluctant to consent to the jurisdiction of New York state courts, lest such a consent
act as a waiver of their right to remove to a federal circuit. The removal statute re-
quired defendants to remove at the time of their first appearance in state court, and
courts quickly interpreted this provision to mean that a defendant's voluntary appear-
ance in state court operated as a waiver of his right to remove. SeeJudiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. at 79 (requiring the removing defendant to file a petition
for removal at the time of "entering his appearance" in state court); see also DILLON,
supra note 115, § 108 (noting that the defendant must promptly exercise his right of
removal and collecting judicial decisions under which a defendant was said to have
waived his right to remove if he "demurs, or pleads, or answers, or otherwise submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the State court"). In-state plaintiff diversity jurisdiction
allowed a New York plaintiff to offer a Virginia defendant some assurance that a con-
sent to litigate in New York would occasion litigation only on the docket of the federal
circuit court to which the Virginia defendant was entitled. Early nineteenth century
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As these early examples of the operation of the diversity statute
demonstrate, Congress did not provide a straightforward grant of di-
versity jurisdiction, but provided instead an opportunity for the out-of-
state citizen to opt into federal court when facing an opponent that
would enjoy a home-court advantage in state court. Not diversity, but
presumptive bias, explains the early contours of the jurisdiction.
IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND DIvERsiTY
If still contested, the story of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment has a familiar set of chapters. Most
everyone agrees that it broadens and extends the guarantees that had
previously appeared in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, making them applicable to citizens of the United States as well as
to citizens of the several states.13 7 The switch to a focus on the rights
of national citizenship corresponded to an emphasis on national citi-
zenship in the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment and
its declaration that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of both the United States and the state in which
they reside.'3 8 The combined language of the Citizenship Clause and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause seeks to ensure that all citizens of
the nation enjoy access to the rights that the Taney Court had point-
edly denied African-Americans in the Dred Scott decision.13 9 ChiefJus-
tice Taney had deployed privileges and immunities to illustrate the
unthinkable consequences of Mr. Scott's quest for freedom and citi-
zenship; 140 the Fourteenth Amendment invested Mr. Scott and other
in-state plaintiff diversity litigation, at least in actions in personam that depended on
defendant's consent to service of process, would thus have preserved an element of
choice for that out-of-state defendant.
137 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 n.15 (1999) (describing the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as modeled on that in Article
IV); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1398-401 (1992) (same).
138 The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part, as follows: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States... are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
139 SeeScottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1856). See generally DON
E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 335-64 (1978) (considering Chief Justice Taney's treatment of citizenship
for purposes of defining the scope of diversity jurisdiction and of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
140 See Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17 (noting the possibility that the recogni-
tion of citizenship for African-Americans might entail rights of gun ownership, free
TIDEIVATER PROBLEM
newly freed slaves with rights of citizenship and the privileges that citi-
zenship had come to entail.
4 1
While the extension of rights of citizenship gave former slaves
access to the federal diversity dockets that Chief Justice Taney's opin-
ion had denied Mr. Scott, 142 justifying the expansion of diversity juris-
diction approved in Tidewater requires a somewhat more intricate
argument. Citizens of the District of Columbia enjoy rights of na-
tional citizenship and the privileges or immunities that accompany
such status but do not become citizens of any state by virtue of their
residence in the District.143 An expansion of diversity jurisdiction for
the benefit of District citizens thus rests not on the express command
of the Fourteenth Amendment but on the combined weight of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Section 5 power of Congress
to enforce the clause "by appropriate legislation.' 44 The enforce-
ment power, much debated in recent years, permits Congress to adopt
remedial and preventive legislation to address perceived violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment by the states. By common agreement,
states that discriminated against out-of-staters were seen throughout
the antebellum period as violating privileges and immunities; 145 diver-
sity jurisdiction was seen as a remedy, not for the explicit acts of dis-
speech, property ownership, and contract enforcement in keeping with the right of
citizens to the protection of their privileges and immunities).
141 On the Fourteenth Amendment's reversal of Scott v. Sandford, see 2 WILLIAM W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1089-95 (1953).
142 Chief Justice Taney's opinion equates citizenship for diversity purposes with
citizenship for purposes of privileges and immunities, however problematically. Cf
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 139, at 356 (criticizing this aspect of Chief Justice Taney's
opinion).
143 Citizens of the District thus lack the right to elect representatives to the House
and Senate, and their participation in presidential electoral politics rests on the ratifi-
cation of the Twenty-Third Amendment. Cf District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418, 432 (1973) (holding that the District is not a "state or territory" within the mean-
ing of federal civil rights law that empowers citizens to sue officials who violate federal
rights).
144 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("Congress shall have power to enforce by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]."). On the scope of
the enforcement power after recent decisions cutting back on its apparent reach, see
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Polycentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003);
Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and
the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1992 (2003).
145 See, e.g., Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886) (holding a Michigan tax
statute unconstitutional because it discriminated against those whose primary place of
business was out-of-state, thereby depriving them of their rights under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
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crimination, but for subtle "evasion and subterfuge" that might evade
effective remediation through the exercise of federal question juris-
diction.146 District citizens can be seen, after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's ratification, as enjoying the same right to enforce state law
rights in the courts of the several states that state citizens had enjoyed
under the terms of Article IV, free from in-state bias.1 47 The exten-
sion of diversity jurisdiction, as a concurrent federal docket available
to District citizens on an equal basis with other national citizens, may
deserve approval as a remedial or preventive measure to ward off any
subtle bias or discrimination that such citizens might experience in
state court litigation.
This Part sketches the argument in favor of a Fourteenth Amend-
ment account of Tidewater, focusing on two major elements. First, the
Part shows that a discriminatory refusal on the part of a state court to
enforce the rights of District citizens at common law would violate the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Second, the Part examines the scope
of Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5. It concludes that,
despite a series of restrictive pronouncement in recent years, the re-
medial or preventive purpose underlying a grant of diversity jurisdic-
tion would justify the exercise of the power. Third, the Part considers
a series of predictable objections.
A. Discrimination Against District Citizens
Imagine that the state of Maryland (the state involved in the Tide-
water litigation) passed laws that imposed a series of disabilities on citi-
zens of the District of Columbia. These disabilities might include
prohibitions (1) against commercial fishing in the waters of the state,
(2) against the practice of law within the state, or (3) against any re-
ceipt of welfare benefits by District citizens who have moved to the
state. My claim is that all such disabilities should fall to a challenge
146 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 93, at 537-38 (Alexander Hamilton):
In order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and im-
munities to which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national
judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one state or its citizens are
opposed to another state and its citizens. To secure the full effect of so
fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary
that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which, having no
local attachments, will likely to be impartial between the different states and
their citizens ....
147 See Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 603 (1949) ("To
put federally administered justice within the reach of District citizens, in claims




based upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
At first blush, such an argument might seem to ignore the fact
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause has a richly deserved reputa-
tion as the "least significant of the provisions . . . of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 48 This lack of significance derives importantly from
the Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases.149 In Slaughter-House,
the Court faced a challenge to laws by which the city of New Orleans
had created a local monopoly in the business of slaughtering animals
for food. Butchers, seeking to ply their trade free from the constraints
of local legislation, invoked the Fourteenth Amendment. 150 Butcher
work was said to be a privilege, and one that the restrictive local laws
abridged in violation of the Constitution. 15 1 Not so, the Court con-
cluded. Worried lest such an expansive conception of the privileges
of trade and business would too broadly involve the federal courts in
policing the commercial life of the states, the Court limited the
clause's application to a narrowly drawn set of "privileges" of national
citizenship. 
152
While many have expressed dissatisfaction with this interpreta-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the clause itself has shown
little growing power. In the most recent case, Saenz v. Roe,15 3 the
Court applied the clause to invalidate a California state law that lim-
ited the welfare benefits available to those who had recently moved to,
and established citizenship in, the state. Although somewhat innova-
tive, the Court based its invalidation of the law on a finding that the
privileges of national citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment in-
148 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281 n.3 (12th ed. 1991).
149 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
150 Id. at 45.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 76. The Court noted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
protects
those privileges and immunities which are fundamental, which belong of
right to the citizens of all governments, and which have at all times been
enjoyed by citizens of the several states," including "protection by the gov-
ernment, with the right to acquire and possess property ... and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety ....
Id. For a representative criticism of this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, in tone if not in content, see CRossKEY, supra
note 141, at 1119 (describing the decision as rendering the clause "completely nuga-
tory and useless").
153 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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cluded a right to travel through, and relocate in, a new state. 154 Thus,
the decision went off on a national citizen's right to travel-a right
that already enjoyed constitutional protection, and one that even the
narrow version of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused in Slaughter-
House Cases had seemed to confirm.' 55 Even this, the dissenters de-
cried as too adventuresome.
15 6
Despite these limits, the posited instances of discrimination by
the state of Maryland would appear to come squarely within the terms
of the prohibition against state laws that abridge the privileges of na-
tional citizens. The argument goes like this. The Court has already
invalidated discrimination against out-of-state citizens of the kinds
posited as violations of the privileges and immunities clause of Article
IV. Thus, in Toomer v. Witsell,157 the Court invalidated a license fee
that discriminated against nonresidents in the "privilege" of trawling
for shrimp; in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,158 the Court
struck down a rule that prohibited nonresident lawyers from becom-
ing members of the New Hampshire bar; and in a series of cases in-
volving welfare and other benefits, the Court has invalidated
restrictions (like those in Saenz) that were seen as burdening the right
to travel.' 59 Similar forms of discrimination targeting citizens of the
District would not, of course, violate Article IV. District citizens lack
citizenship in a state for purposes of pursuing claims under that provi-
154 See id. at 499-500 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). Previous
decisions had recognized a right to travel, and some freedom from the denial of wel-
fare benefits to travelers newly arrived in the state. Saenz innovated by basing a new
right to travel on rights of national citizenship, finding that citizens of the state of
California were entitled to challenge durational restrictions on their welfare benefits
that limited their freedom to move to California and become citizens of that state.
155 See id. at 503-04 (citing Slaughter-House as having established the right of na-
tional citizens to travel and establish citizenship in a new state).
156 See id. at 513-04 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
157 334 U.S. 385 (1948); cf Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)
(No. 3230) (upholding NewJersey's discriminatory refusal to permit a nonresident to
harvest oysters in the state and holding that oyster harvesting was not a fundamental
right within the meaning of Article IV).
158 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
159 See, e.g., Atty. Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (invalidating a
state employment preference to veterans requiring residence in the state at the time
the veterans entered the military as a violation of the right to travel); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (invalidating as unconstitu-
tional a municipal ordinance requiring at least forty percent of employees on city
construction projects to be city residents); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(invalidating as unconstitutional provisions denying welfare assistance to residents of
a state who had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least two years immediately
preceding their applications for assistance).
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sion. But such forms of discrimination against the District citizen
should still violate the Constitution, as action that abridges the privi-
leges and immunities of national citizenship within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. District citizens, in principle, should en-
joy the same protection from in-state favoritism and discriminatory
burdens that other citizens of the United States enjoy.
Once we accept the principle that District citizens enjoy the same
right as other citizens of the United States to freedom from discrimi-
natory state action that favors insiders, then the foundation for an
expansion of diversity appears relatively straightforward. If discrimi-
natory favoritism violates the Constitution, then the exclusion of Dis-
trict citizens from access to the Maryland courts for the enforcement
of state law rights would do so as well. Indeed, as we see in the early
interpretations of Article IV, the core feature of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was to eliminate disabilities based upon nonresi-
dence in the state, and to ensure that outsiders would enjoy access to
well functioning state court systems for the enforcement of state law
rights. 160 Fear that outsiders might suffer both explicit and subtle
forms of discrimination explains both the provisions of Article IV and
the grant of diversity jurisdiction. These concerns surely apply with
equal force to citizens of the District of Columbia, who lack state citi-
zenship but whose national citizenship entitles them to Fourteenth
Amendment protection from discriminatory state action.
B. The Scope of Congressional Enforcement Power
Establishing that discrimination by the state of Maryland against
District citizens in the enforcement of state law rights would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment represents but the first step toward the
defense of Tidewaterjurisdiction. We must also consider the scope of
Congress's enforcement power under Section 5, and whether such
power permits Congress to remedy such discrimination by providing
an alternative federal diversity docket for the adjudication of claims in
which bias against District citizens might predictably arise. Here, the
challenge lies in bringing the extension of diversity jurisdiction to Dis-
trict citizens within the somewhat restrictive framework that the Court
has created for the assessment of Section 5 power.
In evaluating the argument for Section 5 power, the starting
point lies with the Court's much debated distinction between laws that
interpret or modify existing constitutional principles, and those that
seek to remedy or prevent constitutional violations. In City of Boerne v.
160 See supra notes 103-08.
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Flores,16 1 the Court considered the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which proposed to reshape the test by which the courts would deter-
mine whether particular state action operated as an actionable bur-
den on the free exercise of religion. This, the Boerne Court ruled,
Congress could not do. While Section 5 authorizes preventative or
remedial legislation, it does not give Congress a role in the interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions. 162 Thus, the statute fell upon the
Court's finding that Congress set out to redraw the line between the
permissible and impermissible.
But while the Boerne Court invalidated laws seen as reshaping the
constitutional free-exercise test, it was careful to reaffirm the validity
of prior cases that upheld Congress's power to prevent and remedy
constitutional violations. 163 Thus, Boerne cited with approval the
Court's earlier statements to the effect that Congress can sometimes
enact remedial legislation that "prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional." 64 The key to the adoption of such remedial legis-
lation, according to the Court, lies in a demonstration that the legisla-
tion satisfies the twin requirements of "congruence" and
"proportionality."' 65 Congruence requires the legislation to corre-
spond to an identified problem of state constitutional violations; pro-
portionality requires Congress to take steps that match the nature of
the problem at hand. The proportionality prong of the test reflects a
concern with statutes that might sweep too broadly, that might perva-
sively prohibit constitutional state action. Statutes more carefully tai-
lored to the problem at hand by including geographic restrictions or
other limitations thus enjoy a stronger likelihood of surviving propor-
tionality scrutiny.
A grant of diversity jurisdiction for citizens of the District may
satisfy the twin requirements of congruence and proportionality. To
be sure, Congress did not make a record of substantial and pervasive
161 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
162 See id. at 519:
Congress' power under [Section 5], however, extends only to 'enforcing' the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this
power as 'remedial.' The design of the Amendment and the text of [Section
5] are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to de-
cree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
States.
Id. (citation omitted).
163 See id. at 518-20 (citing with approval Rome v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 156 (1980);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
164 Id. at 518.
165 Id. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the in-
jury to be prevented ... and the means adapted to that end.").
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discrimination against District citizens as a predicate for the adoption
of the law extending diversity jurisdiction to them. Rather, Congress
acted to extend the benefits of diversity jurisdiction on an even-
handed basis to all citizens of the United States.1 66 The justification
for the statute thus lies in the perception that an overlapping and
redundant federal diversity docket provides an effective tool to pre-
vent the possibility of state court bias against nonresidents that might
otherwise occur. As with the case of diversity generally, the provision
of a diversity docket for District citizens rests on the intuition that the
docket will prevent subtle bias by enabling litigants to escape state
court processes when the threat of such bias seems evident to them. If
accurate, the intuition suggests that relatively few examples of overt
bias will appear in the cases.
The Tidewater statute also appears to satisfy the proportionality
prong. Congress simply drew upon two hundred years of experience
with the use of diversity as a remedy for possible bias against out-of-
state citizens in fashioning a remedy for similar bias against District
citizens. The remedy sweeps no more broadly than necessary to deal
with the problem; indeed, it applies with some precision to the prob-
lem at hand. In addition, the statute does not seem to suffer from
problems of overbreadth in prohibiting state action that would other-
wise be constitutionally valid. State dockets remain available for the
enforcement of rights at common law, subject only to the possibility of
removal to federal court in appropriate cases. Notably, all such claims
will be governed, under Erie, 167 by the rules of common law that the
states courts themselves develop.
Erie's application thus helps to distinguish the diversity statute in
Tidewater from the federal right of action that the Court invalidated in
United States v. Morrison.168 In Morrison, Congress amassed a substan-
tial record of gender-based discrimination on the part of state justice
systems.169 The record was offered in support of a statute that created
a new private right of action enabling individuals to recover damages
166 Of course, the literature reflects a wide divergence of views about the benefits
and costs of diversity jurisdiction, and whether the original bias-preventing concep-
tion of the diversity grant can still justify the jurisdiction today. Compare Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 330-32 (suggesting reasons to believe that bias-prevention may still
have a role in supporting diversity jurisdiction), with RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 210-21 (1996) (considering the possible ben-
efits of diversity, including bias-prevention, and the consequences of abolition).
167 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
168 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
169 Id. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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for gender-related violence. 170 The perceived problem in Morrison
stemmed from the fact that the federal statute went beyond providing
remedies against state actors for state constitutional violations, and es-
tablished a new federal standard of conduct for private parties who
have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.1 71 The Tide-
water statute, by contrast, does not prescribe any new federal lights of
action, and does not regulate private parties, but simply shifts state law
rights of action into federal court for decision in accordance with
Erie.172 The statute thus applies no more broadly than necessary to
address the problem of possibly subtle state court bias against citizens
of the District.
C. Advantages of a Section 5 Account of Tidewater
A Section 5 account of the diversity statute upheld in Tidewater
enjoys some advantages over its closest competitors. Like a theory of
protective jurisdiction, the Section 5 account posits that claims
brought by or against District citizens on the diversity dockets of fed-
eral courts in the several states actually arise under federal law for
jurisdictional purposes under Article III, even though state law would
determine their resolution. The main difference lies in the source of
federal power. Under a theory of protective jurisdiction, Congress ob-
tains its power to regulate from its plenary control over the territories
and the District of Columbia. 173 But such control, while it goes a long
way to justify federal legislation in the territories, has greater difficulty
in justifying an expansion of federal judicial power outside the
District.
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
171 The Court's decision in Morrison was thus driven in part by the perception that
Congress had set out to regulate private conduct under the Commerce Clause, but
had exceeded recently articulated bounds in doing so. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at
608-19. As with other recent limits on the scope of Section 5, the Morrison Court
acted in part to prevent an end-run around its restrictions on the Commerce Power.
See also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-91 (2000) (coupling a finding
that Congress lacked power to regulate under the Commerce Clause with a finding
that the particular statute exceeded the boundaries of proper Section 5 legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
172 See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1946), construed in Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Erie, of course, permits federal courts to apply their own
procedural rules, but compels them to respect and enforce the rules of decisions that
have been articulated by the state courts. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Erie's application
helps to clarify that the expansion of federal jurisdiction would comply with the re-
quirement that Section 5 legislation make "no substantive change in the governing
law." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
173 See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1973).
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The Section 5 account, by contrast, links the theory of jurisdic-
tion more directly to the work being done. Congress already enjoys
power to provide courts for the territories, and for the District, and to
enable citizens to litigate a range of matters in those courts, including
disputes with the citizens of other states. The problem for diversity
jurisdiction in cases involving District citizens and state citizens has
always arisen in cases in which District citizens file suit in other states:
in Hepburn, the District plaintiff sued in Virginia federal court;174 in
Tidewater, the District citizen sued in Maryland. 175 By portraying di-
versity as a remedy for subtle bias on the part of state courts against
citizens of the District (bias that would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if overtly discriminatory), the Section 5 account offers a more
straightforward rationale for the provision of a federal alternative to
state court litigation.
The Section 5 account also has the advantage of linking jurisdic-
tional expansion to a relevant change in the scope of federal power.
Since Marshall's decision in Hepburn, neither the text of Article III nor
the nature of Congress's power over the District of Columbia has
changed in relevant ways. But the addition of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment expands the Constitution's protection against state abridgement
of privileges and immunities to encompass the rights of both state and
national citizens. 176 Citizens of the United States living in the territo-
ries and the District of Columbia, who lack a domicile and citizenship
in one of the states, nonetheless enjoy the same immunity from dis-
criminatory denial of their rights as citizens of the United States living
within one of the states. By extending the possibility of diversity juris-
diction to national citizens living in the territories, moreover, the Sec-
tion 5 account picks up a common theme of antebellum
jurisprudence. Many jurists from the era, including Chief Justice Ta-
ney, had come to view the right to a federal diversity docket as one of
the privileges of citizenship within the meaning of Article IV. 1 77 A
174 Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 445 (1805).
175 Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 583.
176 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
177 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1856) (asking in a diversity
case whether a person of African descent can become a member or citizen of the
United States, entitled as such to "all the rights, privileges, and immunities" accorded
to such citizens, including as one such right "the privilege of suing in a court of the
United States"); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 355 (1855) (noting that
"[w]ithout [a federal court with diversity jurisdiction], the citizens of each State could
not have enjoyed all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, as
they were intended to be secured" by Article IV of the Constitution); Marshall v. Balt.
& Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326 (1853) (specifically endorsing Hamil-
ton's suggested linkage between Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause and
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Fourteenth Amendment devoted to overturning Scott v. Sandford by
expanding the definition of citizenship could plausibly expand access
to diversity.
Although Congress did not articulate a Section 5 theory in so
many words, the House Judiciary Committee report that accompanied
the proposed legislation in 1940 points in somewhat the same direc-
tion.178 After tracing the development of the Hepburn line of cases,
179
the report turned to develop an affirmative case for the existence of
legislative power, and here the argument grew more intricate. It
noted the broad scope of Congress's power over the District of Colum-
bia, and cited the Court's recognition that citizens of the District en-
joy "rights, guaranties, and immunities" under the Constitution that
include a "right" to the determination of their disputes at the seat of
government before an independent judiciary.18 0 Seeing access to fed-
eral court as a right available to the citizens of the District, the report
explained as follows:
For example, a citizen of a State may [demand access to federal
court] when involved in a case or controversy with a citizen of an-
other State. The mere fact that the Constitution guarantees this
right to the citizens of a State in no way prohibits the Congress from
Article III's diversity provision). To modem eyes, the suggested equation of the right
to sue in diversity with a privilege of state citizenship looks odd; we see diversity as a
source ofjudicial power that Congress may confer on the federal courts, or not, as it
sees fit. Treating diversity itself as a constitutional privilege might appear to threaten
congressional control over federal jurisdiction, and the widely acknowledged right of
Congress to do away with the jurisdiction altogether. Cf Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 448-49 (1850) (upholding congressional power to qualify diversity juris-
diction). In my Section 5 account, citizens enjoy a privilege of freedom from discrimi-
nation that Congress may implement through the extension of diversity jurisdiction.
Diversity thus remedies a subtle violation of the rights of citizens, rather than acting
itself as such a right. Such an approach avoids any conflict with the Supreme Court's
recognition that the citizens of a territory have no constitutional right to a diversity
docket, even where the privileges and immunities of citizenship apply to them. See
Chase Manhattan Bank v. S. Acres Dev. Co., 434 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1978) (rejecting
claim that privileges and immunities clauses prohibit Congress from withholding or
restricting diversity jurisdiction).
178 See H.R. REP. No. 76-1756 (1940). The Senate adopted the provision without
debate and did not contribute anything meaningful to the provision's legislative
history.
179 The report began by tracing the origins of the Hepburn rule and its extension
to cases involving both citizens of the District and citizens of the territories. Id. at 1-2.
The report noted that the rule had been often criticized but never overturned, de-
spite language in Marshall's opinion suggesting that the matter was one for Congress
to address. Id. at 2.
180 Id. (quoting O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)).
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extending that same privilege to others who are not technically citi-
zens of a State.
18 1
Although somewhat inartful, 182 the report links diversity to the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, and suggests that Congress
can extend the right to citizens of the District on the same terms as
citizens of the several States. A Section 5 account thus fits tolerably
well with the legislative impulse that seemingly informed the enact-
ment of the law that the Tidewater Court upheld.
D. The Scope of a Section 5 Account
Apart from linking the expansion of diversity to a claim about the
rights that citizens of the District hold in common with citizens of the
several states, the 1940 Act raises questions about the scope of con-
gressional power. At the same time it brought citizens of the District
within the diversity jurisdiction, Congress also made provision for di-
versity jurisdiction over claims involving citizens of what were then the
territories of Alaska and Hawaii. 18 3 Such an expansion of authority
raises questions about the scope and limits of a Section 5 defense of
the jurisdictional expansion approved in Tidewater.
The first puzzle-that presented by the inclusion of the citizens
of the territories-seems relatively easy to solve. Section 5 power
should enable Congress to protect any citizen of the United States
from the subtle discrimination they might face in state court litigation
with an in-state citizen by enabling the territorial citizen to secure ac-
cess to a federal diversity docket as an alternative. Congress might
thus offer a diversity docket to the citizen of Hawaii (during its territo-
rial phase) when litigating in the state courts of the contiguous United
States. Similarly Congress could offer a diversity docket to citizens of
Puerto Rico today (as it has done).184 The only restriction on such
power would flow from the requirements that Congress act on behalf
of citizens of the United States and that it act to prevent possible state
discrimination. So long as the territorial citizen enjoyed rights as a
citizen of the United States, extension of diversity for their benefit
would come within the ambit of the Section 5 account.
181 Id. at 3.
182 Thus, the report glosses over the notion that Article III sets the outer bounda-
ries of the judicial power and over the fact that Congress can decide, within such
boundaries, whether to confer diversity jurisdiction on the lower federal courts, or
not, as it sees fit.
183 For the text of the statute, see supra note 2.
184 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2000) (defining "States" for purposes of diversity to
include the Territories, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).
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Such an account suggests certain limits on the power of Congress
under Section 5 to broaden diversity jurisdiction within the territories
themselves. A plaintiff from California cannot plausibly claim access
to a diversity docket in the District of Columbia on the ground that
she will otherwise suffer possibly biased decisions on the part of the
local state court. The court system in the District, itself a creature of
Congress, operates as part of the federal government. However bi-
ased the local courts in the District, the bias could not fairly be seen as
state discrimination against an outsider, and would not appear to
bring into play enforcement powers conferred to deal with state dis-
crimination. But the absence of Section 5 authority would not affect
the legality of diversity jurisdiction in the District. The Court has long
held that Congress may give territorial courts the functional
equivalent of diversity jurisdiction in disputes involving outsiders as
part of Congress's plenary power over the District and the territo-
ries.1 8 5 Both Congress, in providing for the jurisdiction upheld in
Tidewater,8 6 and the Court in permitting its exercise,18 7 acknowl-
edged that Article I territorial courts could exercise jurisdiction over
disputes between territorial citizens and citizens of a State. So despite
the fact that the Section 5 account would not apply, Congress faces no
real obstacle in providing for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction by
the courts of the District and the territories.
The focus on national citizenship as the trigger of Congress's Sec-
tion 5 power raises a final question about the scope of the suggested
account. Could Congress provide a citizen of the United States, domi-
ciled abroad, with authority to invoke the diversity dockets of the fed-
eral courts? Under a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that U.S.
citizens must be citizens of a state to invoke diversity jurisdiction, and
that state citizenship turns on an inquiry into domicile as the test of
residence under the Fourteenth Amendment. 188 On such an ap-
proach, Americans domiciled abroad lack state citizenship and access
185 See supra note 96 (citing Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810)).
186 See supra note 180 and accompanying text (referring to the power of federal
courts at the seat of the government to hear claims involving citizens of the District
and citizens of other States).
187 See Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590 (1948) (plurality opinion)
(noting the availability of Article I courts in the District of Columbia to hear claims
similar to that in Tidewater, and suggesting that Congress might establish similar Arti-
cle I courts for the benefit of District citizens throughout the country).
188 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Alden, 136 U.S. 348, 351-53 (1890). Domicile, in turn,
depends on a finding that the individual in question has established a fixed and per-




to diversity dockets.1 8 9 The Section 5 account would seemingly permit
Congress to reverse that conclusion, and to expand diversity to en-
compass the claims of expatriate Americans. Their status as national
citizens would trigger Congress's power to offer them the protections
of a diversity docket anytime litigation would otherwise go forward
before a state court that might view the expatriate as an outsider, and
target of possible discrimination. On this view, the outsider status of a
U.S. citizen, whether based on domicile in the District of Columbia,
on domicile in a territory of the United States, or on domicile in a
foreign state, would trigger the protective Section 5 authority. 190
E. Criticisms of a Section 5 Account of Tidewater
1. Trivializing the Fourteenth Amendment?
Critics may worry that this suggested use of the Section 5 enforce-
ment power trivializes the Fourteenth Amendment by placing it in the
service of Congress's power to expand diversity jurisdiction. To some
extent, that may be so. But three other factors deserve consideration.
First, we can see some evidence that Congress expanded diversity juris-
diction during Reconstruction, in an effort to provide broader protec-
tion to out-of-state litigants before presumptively hostile state
courts. 19 1 Such evidence provides some historical support for a diver-
189 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 922-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (concluding that Taylor, a citizen of the United States, was domiciled
in England; such domicile meant that she lacked state citizenship within the United
States for diversity purposes).
190 One might also question the power of Congress to provide a diversity docket in
a state that might be expected to be neutral as between two contending parties from
other states (or territories). As originally enacted, diversity applied only to cases
brought in the federal court of a state that was expected to lack neutrality. Thus, in a
dispute between citizens of New York and Virginia, for example, the Judiciary Act
made no provision for diversity jurisdiction in the neutral forum of Maryland. See
supra notes 120, 123 and accompanying text. But while such a limit may have ap-
pealed to the drafters of the Judiciary Act, Congress has long since abandoned that
limit and has made diversity turn on citizenship. Thus, although the Maryland state
court might appear to be neutral in a dispute between corporations from New York
and Virginia, that neutrality does not now bar diversity jurisdiction. Yet the fact of
neutrality might be seen as limiting Congress's enforcement power under Section 5
when the case happens to involve a Maryland court, a District corporation and a New
York corporation instead.
191 Two statutes in particular expanded diversity shortly after the Civil War. See
Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (permitting removal of a separable contro-
versy and thus overruling the traditional rule that required all defendants to join to-
gether in a petition for removal); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558 (permitting
either the plaintiff or defendant to petition for removal upon a showing that "from
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sity expanding conception of Reconstruction. Second, norms of
equality seem to have informed Congress's decision in 1940 to expand
diversity for the benefit of District citizens. 192 Third, the suggested
argument does not foreclose other claims that courts and scholars
might wish to make on behalf of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The clause might well provide a vehi-
cle for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, as many have argued,
193
and still perform the more prosaic function of securing access to a
diversity docket for a group of citizens whose lack of formal state citi-
zenship might otherwise stand in the way. Providing support for an
expansion of diversity on this view need not be seen as cheapening the
currency of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Corporate Citizenship
A second important criticism might point to the fact that the defi-
nition of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment excludes the sin-
gle most important beneficiary of diversity jurisdiction, the American
business corporation. Corporations are generally regarded, for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction, as citizens of both the state of their in-
corporation and the state of their principal place of business.' 9 4 But
while corporations frequently appear as litigants on federal diversity
dockets, 195 the Court has consistently ruled that corporations are not
citizens within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses
of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. 196 Whatever work the
prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court").
Both statutes were enacted before the general grant of federal question jurisdiction in
1875, and both applied to diversity jurisdiction.
192 See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing the equal treatment
rationale that informed the legislation's enactment).
193 See AmAR, supra note 95, at 166-67. But cf. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949) (rejecting argument that the Reconstruction Congress intended to incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 196-97 n.59 (1980) (considering the privileges or immuni-
ties clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a textual basis for incorporation).
194 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
195 Indeed, in Tidewater itself, the plaintiff was a corporation, organized under the
laws of the District of Columbia, and had brought suit in a Maryland federal district
court against a Virginia firm.
196 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (holding that
natural persons alone are entitled to privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 177-78 (1868) (holding that corporations are not citizens with the mean-
ing of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV).
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privileges and immunities of citizenship might do to support the con-
gressional expansion of diversity upheld in Tidewater, its inapplicabil-
ity to corporations might seem to limit its effectiveness as a tool of
jurisdictional expansion.
One answer to this critique may lie in doctrinal developments
that extend constitutional protections from state discrimination to
corporations under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Corporations may, of course, challenge discriminatory
state legislation that forecloses them from local markets under the
dormant Commerce Clause.' 97 Even where Commerce Clause protec-
tions do not apply, the Court has adopted an expansive conception of
equal protection to safeguard corporate insurance firms from state ec-
onomic discrimination.' 98 Because corporations are "persons" for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, 199 state discrimination
against them would bring the enforcement powers of Congress into
play under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. One might thus
work around the corporate gap in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause by relying upon this equal protection-based limit on discrimi-
nation against out-of-state corporations.
Even if it poses a problem for reliance upon Congress's Section 5
power, this criticism from corporate citizenship brings into sharp fo-
cus the theme of constitutional change that underlies this Article's
analysis of the Tidewater problem. Early authorities closely linked the
privileges of citizenship under Article IV to the scope of diversity juris-
diction in Article III. Chief Justice Marshall resisted any expansion of
diversity to reach cases in which nondiverse plaintiffs might join with
diverse plaintiffs to enforce a joint liability.200 He also resisted any
extension of diversity to corporate bodies, taking the view that the "cit-
197 For a general introduction to the dormant Commerce Clause as a check on
discriminatory state legislation, see JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw § 8.1 (6th ed. 2000).
198 Judicial limits on state localism under the Commerce Clause do not apply to
the business of insurance, which Congress placed beyond the reach of the dormant
Commerce Clause in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408, 414 (1946). Nonetheless, certain state tax laws in the insurance
realm have been invalidated on equal protection grounds, notwithstanding their ap-
parent similarity to a proscribed commerce challenge. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 874-83 (1985) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection
Clause, a state law that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at a discriminatory
rate, and noting the inapplicability of both the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, but nonetheless extending equal protec-
tion to reach discrimination).
199 See Ward, 470 U.S. at 881 n.9.
200 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
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izens" for purposes of diversity were the natural persons whose finan-
cial interests were at stake and not the inanimate corporate body that
had come to personify those financial interests. 20 1 The combination
of Chief Justice Marshall's complete diversity rule and his refusal to
treat corporations as citizens imposed a dramatic restriction on the
ability of business corporations to secure a federal diversity docket.20
2
Both doctrines have given way. The Taney Court overturned
Chief Justice Marshall's view of corporate citizenship, creating a ro-
bust if fictional presumption that the citizenship of the shareholders
corresponded to that of the state that had issued the firm's charter of
incorporation. 20 3 Such a fictional presumption of shareholder citi-
zenship in the state of incorporation lasted until 1958, when Congress
expanded corporate citizenship by deeming the corporation's princi-
pal place of business to be an additional state of citizenship. 20 4 Today,
we no longer think of the shareholders' states of citizenship as at all
relevant to the inquiry into the citizenship of a corporation for diver-
sity purposes. Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall's complete diversity
rule gave way in State Farm to the argument that Congress may rely
upon minimal diversity in expanding the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over multi-party litigation. 205 Something very similar occurred
in connection with class action litigation; the Supreme Court has held
that the citizenship of the class representative determines the citizen-
ship of the class for diversity purposes
°206
201 See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67-70 (1809).
202 Any publicly held company would be denied access to diversity entirely if the
citizenship of its many shareholders determined its citizenship for diversity purposes,
and the law continued to insist on complete diversity. Cf United Steelworkers v. R.H.
Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1965) (holding that the citizenship of an unin-
corporated association is to be determined by reference to the citizenship of all its
members, practically foreclosing national labor unions from access to diversity dock-
ets under the complete diversity rule).
203 See Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853); Louisville
R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 552-56 (1844).
204 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958). For an account, see James W. Moore & Donald
T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction
Revisited, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1426 (1964) (examining the development of the corporate
diversity fiction and the problems in its applications).
205 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). State
Farm did not overrule Strawbridge, of course; the complete diversity rule remains appli-
cable in litigation under § 1332. State Farm simply makes the minimal diversity option
available to Congress.
206 See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921). The
rule places diversity within the control of the lawyer, who can often choose a class
representative that confers or defeats diversity jurisdiction in accordance with the law-
yer's own preferences as to forum choice. As with the case of corporations, the citi-
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Such changes sever the historic connection between the rights of
citizenship in Article IV and the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Arti-
cle III. They also suggest that the continuing justification for diversity
jurisdiction in disputes involving corporate parties lies not in the pos-
sibility of state court bias against natural persons who happen to live
out-of-state, but in a fear that local courts and local juries will exact a
disproportionate share of the value of national business enterprises.
Just as the Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limits on the
imposition of punitive damages that reflect worries about dispropor-
tionate exactions,20 7 so too has the Court limited the power of state
legislatures to impose a disproportionate share of taxes on nationwide
business entities. 20 The rhetoric that supports the adoption of the
Class Action Fairness legislation, now pending in the Senate, relies less
upon traditional theories of bias against out-of-state citizens than on
bias against the Fortune 500.209
It seems odd, in 2004, that Congress would propose to address a
problem of interstate commerce (excessive localism in class action
awards) through the use of minimal diversity (expanding the scope of
diversity jurisdiction over class actions, primarily to enable firms to
remove such claims to federal court). Diversity preserves the applica-
tion of state law under Erie and does not fit particularly well with
problems of nationwide scope. In the class action context, for exam-
ple, diversity preserves the conflicting bodies of state law that make
the certification of nationwide class actions virtually impossible today
in federal court. Ordinarily, when Congress perceives a problem of
nationwide scope, it fashions a nationally uniform body of law to ad-
zenship of the interested parties themselves has grown somewhat remote from the
jurisdictional inquiry in many multi-party cases.
207 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 578 (1996) (concluding
that due process restricts the award of excessive punitive damages and basing decision
in part on evidence that the firm had a nationwide compliance program aimed at
complying with the standards of the most demanding state regulation); cf. State Farm
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003) (suggesting the use of ratios be-
tween actual and punitive damages as one test of excessiveness).
208 The Court's dormant Commerce Clause line of cases can be understood as
recognizing that states have incentives to advance the interests of insiders by shifting
costs onto outsiders and onto federal instrumentalities. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 197. The Court has extended the rule of fair treatment for outsiders to the tax
field, where it precludes disproportionate exactions. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (establishing a four-part test, including fair
apportionment, to determine the constitutionality of state taxation of interstate
commerce).
209 See S. REP. No. 108-123, at 5-28 (2003) (describing state court class action liti-
gation as presenting a threat to interstate commerce and identifying excessive state
court awards as the culprit).
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dress the problem. In the proposed class action legislation, the only
nationally uniform rules are the nominally procedural rules that gov-
ern the certification and consolidation of class action litigation; state
law would continue to control the underlying questions of
substance. 2
10
All of which points out a fundamental disjunction between the
national interests that seem to justify diversity jurisdiction today and
the problem of discrimination against another state's citizens that
grounded the jurisdiction in the Republic's early years. Chief Justice
Marshall, perhaps not surprisingly, foresaw the change, and provided
ajurisdictional tool to address the problem. In Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux, 211 ChiefJustice Marshall stuck closely to classic theory, tak-
ing both a narrow view of the scope of federal question jurisdiction
over the claims of a private federal banking corporation and a narrow
view of diversity jurisdiction as it applied to corporate affairs. But in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,212 Chief Justice Marshall adjusted
course, holding both that the second bank's charter conferred federal
question jurisdiction through its sue-and-be-sued clause and that such
jurisdiction was consistent with constitutional limits. Chief Justice
Marshall's decision opened up the possibility that the federal govern-
ment might charter business corporations (within the boundaries of
its enumerated powers), and that the affairs of such corporations
(both internal and external) would be subject to regulation through
litigation in the federal courts. Marshall's purpose in doing so, nicely
articulated in that other banking case, McColluch v. Maryland,213 was to
protect nationwide enterprises from the partial regulatory exactions
of state governments.
Today, we have relatively few nationally chartered business corpo-
rations, and the Osborn rule applies only where the federal govern-
ment owns a substantial share.2 14  Corporate charter-making,
especially for nationwide businesses, remains a task for state regula-
tors, primarily those in Delaware. We have thus preserved the fiction
210 One might cynically suppose that the minimal diversity approach seeks to kill
the nationwide class action by preserving conflicting state law and shifting litigation to
federal courts known for their hostility toward the certification of such classes.
211 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
212 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
213 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
214 See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2000) (foreclosing federal question jurisdiction over the
claims of federal corporations, except where the federal government owns the major-
ity share). For a summary of federally chartered corporations, see Christina Maistrel-
lis, Comment, American Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E.: An Open Door to the Federal Courts for
Federally Chartered Corporations, 45 EMORY LJ. 771 (1996).
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of state citizenship for corporations, even as we have fashioned rules
(of constitutional law) that seek to protect national businesses from
state localism. Congress might provide such protection more directly
by taking over the business of corporate charter-making, at least for
firms that operate throughout the country, and by enabling such en-
terprises to sue in federal court on an Osborn theory. Instead, Con-
gress has deferred to the Delaware exception and has largely stayed
away, at least since its Gilded Age experiment with federal railroad
corporations.
21 5
National corporations remain, as a consequence of our peculiar
history, creatures of state law. But that need not foreclose their access
to diversity dockets, as the minimal diversity legislation in the class
action arena nicely illustrates. Just as minimal diversity legislation pro-
poses to disaggregate the state class action by looking to the citizen-
ship of the members of the class, so too might diversity take
cognizance of the shareholders whose investments make up the mod-
ern corporation. On such an approach, minimal diversity of corpo-
rate shareholders and the opposing party would likely support
jurisdiction in any case involving a publicly held corporation. Tidewa-
ter legislation that relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment to secure
diversity jurisdiction over the claims of natural persons might rely in-
stead upon minimal diversity to reach corporations organized under
the laws of the District of Columbia.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Fallon has observed, federal jurisdictional law
presents particularly acute problems of intertemporal synthesis. 216
Unlike many other provisions of the Constitution, Article III has not
been amended since the Eleventh Amendment became law during
the Constitution's first decade of existence. Many of the sweeping
constitutional movements that have since left their mark on the docu-
ment-movements like radical reconstruction, women's suffrage, and
progressivism-did not produce any formal changes to the terms of
Article 111.217 The great expansion of federal jurisdiction that fol-
215 For a discussion of the importance of possible federal regulatory oversight as a
check on Delaware's monopoly in the incorporation business, see MarkJ. Roe, Dela-
ware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588 (2003).
216 Richard Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 953, 980-83 (1994) (crediting 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991), for
highlighting problems of intertemporal synthesis and exploring those problems in
connection with Article III and Reconstruction).
217 The Fourteenth Amendment's failure to amend the "judicial power" makes the
Court's sovereign immunity abrogation jurisprudence seem somewhat contrived, to
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lowed the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments came about entirely as a result of statutory change and
did not result from any direct constitutional tinkering with the judicial
power. As a result, many continue to view the original understanding
of Article III (as expressed in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and else-
where) 2 18 as relevant to interpretive issues today, notwithstanding the
great realignment of state and federal power that followed the Civil
War and the growth of a national economy.
Tidewater poses these problems of intertemporal synthesis in clas-
sic terms. When the issue first arose in Hepburn v. Elzey, the Supreme
Court held that citizens of the District of Columbia were not citizens
of a state for purposes of invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. Although not entirely clear, Justice Marshall seemingly
based his opinion on a reading of the Constitution, which he de-
scribed as consistently using the term "State" to refer to a full-fledged
member of the Union and as ruling out the possibility of state-like
status for the District of Columbia. Short of a constitutional amend-
ment that confers statehood upon the District of Columbia, or an
amendment to Article III, Hepburn would have seemed to preclude
the exercise of diversity jurisdiction in Tidewater.2 1 9 Precisely that view
informed Justice Frankfurter's dissent, and its emphasis on the rela-
tive specificity and concreteness of the terms of the judicial article. 220
This relative precision meant to Justice Frankfurter that Article III,
say the least. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 95 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("Except insofar as it has been incorporated into the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is entirely the product of judge-
made law.").
218 It would be interesting to test the hypothesis that the forms of originalism,
including close attention to text, structure and history, play a more influential role in
the federal courts' scholarship than in other fields of inquiry. A nickel says we cite
Farrand with greater frequency than most.
219 Of course, one can treat Hepburn as leaving open the constitutional issue and
basing its decision on the terms of the statute.
220 Frankfurter's distinction reads as follows:
Great concepts like "Commerce ... among the several States," "due process
of law," "liberty," "property" were purposely left to gather meaning from ex-
perience. For they relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact,
and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stag-
nant society remains unchanged. But when the Constitution in turn gives
strict definition of power or specific limitations upon it we cannot extend
the definition or remove the translation.




unlike the more open-ended assurances of equal protection and due
process, would not support an evolving interpretation.
221
One can, of course, challenge the specificity and concreteness
thesis, although none of the Justices did so in Tidewater. The sheer
number of competing theories of Article III gives some reason to
doubt any claim of precision and technical clarity. But while Justice
Jackson advanced an adventuresome theory of congressional power to
step outside the boundaries of Article III altogether, it was a theory
that few Justices, then or now, have seen as workable. The crucial
votes of Justices Rutledge and Murphy rested on a decision to over-
turn Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of Article III, rather than a
theory of constitutional change or an agreement with Justice Jackson's
proposed theory of Article I expansion. Most everyone else joined
with Justice Frankfurter in decrying the potential breadth of Justice
Jackson's formulation and joined the rejection ofJustice Jackson's im-
plicit claim that times had changed and required a new account of the
scope of the judicial power. The majority's rejection of a loosely con-
structed Article III corresponds to the current Court's reluctance to
espouse an expansive conception of protective jurisdiction as a tool of
jurisdictional expansion.
Yet all of this insistence on the preservation of crisp jurisdictional
boundaries seemingly came with little recognition of the enormous
expansion that corporate citizenship has worked in the scope of diver-
sity jurisdiction. Under Chief Justice Marshall's formulation in Straw-
bridge and Deveaux, the inability of corporations with widely dispersed
shareholders to claim rights of citizenship would have foreclosed their
access to diversity dockets altogether. Had such a doctrine prevailed,
Congress may have taken over the business of providing charters for
multi-state corporations and have empowered them to litigate in fed-
eral court on the basis of the federal question jurisdiction recognized
in Osborn.2 22 But instead, the Court invested corporations with state
221 For a depiction of the Tidewater problem in terms of interpretive changes over
time, see PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING 204-06 (2d ed. 1992).
222 Such an approach prevailed briefly, following the grant of jurisdiction over
disputes involving federal corporations, and the broad interpretation of that statute
during the Gilded Age. See Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885):
[C]orporations of the United States, created by and organized under acts of
Congress ... are entitled as such to remove into the Circuit Courts of the
United States suits brought against them in the State courts . . . on the
ground that such suits are suits 'arising under the laws of the United States.'
Id. But the broad availability of federal charters of incorporations for multi-state busi-
nesses probably had to await the expansion of the commerce power in the twentieth
century.
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citizenship for diversity purposes and fundamentally transformed the
nature of the jurisdiction from one that sought to protect the civil
rights and commercial interests of natural persons to one that offered
protection to national business enterprises from state localism. By the
time of Tidewater, this conception was so deeply ingrained that Frank-
furter based his attack not on diversity as a jurisdiction of corporate
protection but on Jackson's proposal to broaden the jurisdiction fur-
ther. In arguing about the jurisdiction for citizens of the District of
Columbia, no one seemed to have noticed that it was a corporate citi-
zen of the District that sought access to the Maryland federal district
court. In worrying about District citizens, the Court seems to have
swallowed the camel and strained at the gnat. 223
Too much has changed to permit a return to Hamilton's account
of relationship between the privileges of citizenship and the grant of
diversity jurisdiction. I do not advocate such an approach here. In-
stead, my Section 5 account seeks to solve one particular problem,
deploying congressional power to prevent state court bias in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment as the justification for the extension of
diversity jurisdiction for the benefit of citizens of the District and the
other territories of the United States. 224 The account offers no gen-
eral theory of intertemporal synthesis under Article III. But it does
offer one way to think about constitutional change and the scope of
the judicial power. By linking jurisdictional expansion to the chang-
ing definition of the rights of national citizenship that accompanied
Reconstruction, the Section 5 account justifies jurisdictional change
by reference to a watershed moment in our constitutional history.
223 Cf Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 625-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (distinguishing be-
tween the "considerable importance" of the principle and the practical insignificance
of the particular grant of jurisdiction).
224 The focus on rights of national citizenship suggests that citizens of territories
who lack such citizenship would not enjoy access to a diversity docket under the ac-
count developed in this Article.
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